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1. Introduction and methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
In March 2003, the social democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder presented 
Agenda 2010, his ambitious plans to reform the German welfare state. Two and a 
half years later, the consequences of meddling with the welfare state are evident. 
Schröder has alienated leftists inside his own party, as well as the Social 
Democrats’ traditional partners – the trade unions. Hundreds of thousands of voters 
have taken to the streets to demonstrate against the “demolition of the welfare 
state”. The fuss has spurred the comeback of Schröder’s political rival Oscar 
Lafontaine, who joined a new left party created as a protest against the 
government’s “neoliberal” politics. In European, state and municipal elections 
following the adoption of Agenda 2010, the government has performed poorly. As a 
reaction to the bad results, Schröder called for early federal elections, which proved 
the end to the Red-Green government. Consequently, Schröder left German 
politics.1 While observers of this scenario ask themselves “what was Schröder 
thinking?”, social researchers struggle with the more general question “how do we 
explain the politics of welfare state retrenchment?”  
“Not the way we explained welfare state expansion!” is renowned Harvard 
professor Paul Pierson’s answer to this question. This thesis will assess the 
arguments of Pierson, whose publications have shifted the welfare state debate 
from explaining the growth of modern welfare states towards questioning welfare 
state retrenchment (Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002:27). He has done so by 
arguing that the theories that explain welfare state expansion (old politics) can not 
explain welfare state retrenchment; we need new theories (new politics). In this 
thesis, I will test his arguments on the recent case of German welfare state 
retrenchment – the reform package Agenda 2010. Thus, my overarching research 
question is: 
“Do “old” or “new politics” best explain recent welfare state retrenchment in 
Germany?”  
                                              
1 At the time of writing (November 13), the CDU/CSU and the SPD have agreed a formal coalition deal to form a left-right 
“grand coalition”. The deal awaits the adoption by the respective party conferences, before Angela Merkel replaces 
Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor on November 22 (the Guardian 11.13.2005).  
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Old politics comprises the three main theories that have been employed to 
explain the development of the modern welfare states: “Logic of industrialism” links 
the growth of the welfare state to economic development; “new institutionalism” 
argues that strong states are likely to produce strong welfare states and “left power 
resources” attributes welfare state expansion to the power of unions and left parties. 
According to Pierson (1996:143, 176), researchers have implicitly used the inverses 
of these models when they aim to explain the “opposite” of welfare state expansion, 
namely welfare state retrenchment. Esping-Andersen, for example, has argued that 
“a theory that seeks to explain welfare state growth should also be able to 
understand its retrenchment or decline” (Esping-Andersen 1990:32).  
This is the argument Pierson aims to refute: “My central thesis is that 
retrenchment is a difficult political enterprise. It is in no sense a simple mirror image 
of welfare state expansion (…)” (Pierson 1994:1-2). Although he admits that the “old 
theories” do contain insights, he argues that variables that were crucial for 
understanding the expansion of the welfare state are of limited use for explaining 
retrenchment (Pierson 1996:144). According to Pierson, new theories are needed 
because politicians operate in a terrain that the welfare state itself has 
fundamentally altered. His arguments draw heavily on the institutionalist school of 
thoughts (Pierson 1994:32) and his focal point is that the existence of the welfare 
state has feedback effects, meaning that “public policies are not only the result of 
but important contributors to political process” (ibid:39, own emphasis in italics). In 
other words, the welfare state must be viewed as an independent variable.  
One of the clearest examples of such feedback effects is the formation of 
new interest groups linked to particular social programs. These groups have 
replaced left parties and unions as defenders of the welfare state (Pierson 1994:29-
30; 1996:150-151). Another feedback effect is that the existence and popularity of 
mature welfare schemes makes politics of retrenchment qualitatively different from 
politics of expansion. The latter is about taking credit for popular politics, the former 
about avoiding blame for unpopular reforms (Pierson 1992; 1996). Although 
Pierson’s theories contain several aspects, this thesis will focus on the concept of 
blame avoidance and the role of new interest groups. These are in other words the 
two main components of the concept new politics.  
This thesis intends to test the explanatory power of inverted versions of the 
“old” theories in comparison with Pierson’s new politics in the German case. To do 
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so, the overarching research question needs to be specified in relation to each 
theory. In this introduction, I will only sketch the research questions that will be 
discussed. I will give a further description of each theory and formulate precise 
hypotheses in the relevant chapters (chapter 3 and 4).  
The new politics model of blame avoidance will be discussed through asking 
whether the Red-Green government has been using blame avoidance strategies to 
retrench the German welfare state.2  Blame avoidance strategies comprise certain 
ways of designing retrenchment. Through obfuscating the visibility of reform, 
compensating politically crucial groups for lost benefits, and dividing constituencies 
by playing one group of beneficiaries against another, governments can minimize 
political costs accompanying retrenchment (Pierson 1996:147). 
The explanatory power of the theory of the new politics will be compared to 
that of the three theories of old politics. In his article “The new politics of the welfare 
state”, Pierson (1996) discusses what an inversion of the “old” theories would imply 
for welfare state retrenchment, and develops more or less explicit research 
questions, some of which I will discuss here: 
A variant of the inverted “logic of industrialism” theory will focus on the 
consequences of global economic change, which puts pressure on modern welfare 
states (Pierson 1996:158). The question asked here is whether social dumping has 
forced the Red-Green government to cut social wages.   
An inversion of the “new institutionalism” argument implies that political 
leaders of “weak states” with strong institutional veto points will have more difficulty 
retrenching the welfare state than will leaders of strong states. Such veto points are 
for example federalism, bicameralism or separations of powers (Pierson 1996:152). 
In Germany, the upper house of Parliament, the Bundesrat, is an example of a 
powerful veto point, which insures that power is not concentrated on the executive. 
The question is whether this diffusion of power also implied a diffusion of 
accountability in the sense that the blame for unpopular retrenchment was shared 
between the government and the opposition.  
                                              
2 For the sake of variation, I will vary between talking about “Schröder”, “the Red-Green government” or “the SPD” 
(SPD=Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland) when I refer to the initiators behind Agenda 2010. In one way, Schröder 
was the motor of reform (Dyson 2005:228). At the same time, the Red-Green government was (more or less) behind him. 
The Green Party did not play as central a role as did the SPD, because all the involved ministries and the chancellor were 
Social Democrats, which justifies a stronger focus on the SPD than on the Greens.   
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Finally, the focus of the inverted “left power resources” theory is the question 
where the opposition against reform comes from. Are left parties and unions main 
defenders of the welfare state or have new interest groups taken over the leading 
role as welfare state guardians? 
Evidently, the different theories illuminate different aspects of the concept 
“retrenchment”, and are not necessarily rival explanations of the same dependent 
variable. I will elaborate on this in the next part, wherein I discuss the methodology 
of this thesis.  
1.2 Methodology  
A single case study is typically defined as an intensive study of many aspects of one 
case (Andersen 1997:8). Case studies are often contrasted to surveys, where a few 
variables are studied across a large sample of cases (Ragin 2000:23). The objective 
of case studies is answering explanatory questions like “how” and “why”, by tracing 
operational links over time, as opposed to questions like “who”, “where” or “what”, 
which are better answered through surveys (Yin 2003:6). Yin adds that a case study 
is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident” (ibid:13). In this thesis, I ask how to explain an empirical case of 
the theoretical concept “retrenchment”. I will study the contemporary phenomenon 
“Agenda 2010” relatively intensely without the ability to manipulate or keep other 
variables constant. That is, the case will be analyzed in its real-life context. This 
study can therefore be defined as a single case study.  
The case study is motivated by Paul Pierson’s theories on welfare state 
retrenchment. The German case of welfare state retrenchment is a typical example 
of what Pierson’s “new” theories and the “old theories” on welfare state 
retrenchment aim at explaining. The case (Agenda 2010) is seen as an empirical 
case of a theoretical population - welfare state retrenchment – and in that sense; the 
case study is implicitly comparative. The question is if the case conforms to the 
models’ expectations. If the conclusion is that new politics can explain the empirical 
case of German welfare state retrenchment, these theories gain credibility. 
Credibility is lost If I on the contrary find that new politics cannot illuminate the 
German case. In the concluding chapter, I will also suggest modifications to 
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Pierson’s theories. Andersen (1997:73) calls such single case studies “theory 
advancing”. The purpose of theory advancing case studies is to use the empirical 
case to develop and advance existing theory, through creating new concepts, 
modifying existing concepts or through falsification or modification of existing theory. 
I will emphasize that one can hardly view the two “theory blocks” of old and 
new politics as rival theories that attempt to explain the same dependent variable 
(retrenchment), in the sense that the strengthening of old politics weakens new 
politics. Generally, the theories complement each other, because they represent 
four “variables” that explain different aspects of retrenchment. As described in the 
introduction, “blame avoidance” has to do with the design of the retrenchment while 
“new industrialism” looks at where pressure for reform comes from. “New 
institutionalism” focuses on the role of institutions in the process leading up to the 
adoption of the reforms, and on the question whether the blame for reforms was 
shared in the aftermath. Lastly, “left power resources” concentrates on where the 
opposition to reform comes from. On some aspects, the theories are competing. 
One example is the claim that new interest groups have taken over the role of left 
powers as welfare state defenders. Generally, however, old and new politics are not 
alternatives to each other. 
If I do find that the strength of left powers, the strength of state institutions 
and “the economy” can illuminate the case of German retrenchment, Pierson’s claim 
that these variables have limited explanatory powers is discredited. New politics is 
however not necessarily challenged. I will pursue this question further in chapter five 
by synthesizing the discussions of each theory and answering the overarching 
research question – whether old or new politics best can explain German 
retrenchment.  
To strengthen the credibility of the discussions held or conclusions made, I 
need to discuss to which degree methodological problems affect my findings. If the 
study is not replicable by other investigators, if I have failed to develop operational 
sets of measures or I conclude wrongly where causal relationships are concerned, 
my conclusions might be the result of faulty methodological choices rather than 
empirical “facts”. The problems of reliability, construct validity and internal validity 
are the focus of the next part. 
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1.2.1 Reliability 
The goal of reliability is to maximize precision, and thereby minimize errors and 
biases (Yin 2003:37). The question is if another researcher would arrive at the same 
findings if he or she replicated the study. The use of various sources of evidence 
when collecting data will enhance the reliability. Yin mentions six sources that a 
researcher can use: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant-observation and physical artifacts (ibid:83).  
In this case study, I have mainly used documentation. As the thesis deals 
with four different theories and consequently looks at Agenda 2010 from several 
different angels, I have not been able to zoom in on the case from any one angle. 
By looking at the case from a distance, the reliability of my findings is probably lower 
than it would be if I had investigated one aspect intensively, which would enable me 
to triangulate by using more types of sources. I could for example have used 
interviews to illuminate the role played by trade unions and “new interest groups” 
(chapter 4.3). When I decided not to conduct any interviews, this was a choice taken 
based on a rational “cost-benefit analysis”, where I concluded that any extra 
information interviews would give, would be too time consuming and limit time 
available for work on other aspects. 
At the time of writing, there were few academic books written on the empirical 
case, Agenda 2010, some academic articles and countless newspaper articles. 
These have been my main sources of information. Newspaper articles do not 
adhere to the same scientific rules as do academic articles. Besides, they are 
secondary sources, and are often written under time pressure or for specific 
purposes. I have tried to compensate for these weaknesses concerning reliability by 
always reading several articles from different newspapers on the same topic to 
verify the factual information. I have stuck to renowned newspapers like Spiegel 
Online, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung, and for the sake of 
diversity of perspectives, I have also read “leftist” papers like taz, die tageszeitung.3 
There are books written on some topics, and in parts 4.1 and 4.3 I use primary 
sources (a government statement, home pages and an official Agenda 2010 leaflet). 
                                              
3 The articles are mainly found in the database Lexis Nexis, which includes all major serious newspapers in Germany. For 
the sake of reader-friendliness, I have shortened the titles of the papers above to “Spiegel”, “Süddeutsche”, “Frankfurter 
Allgemeine” and “taz”.  
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There was scant documentation on some subjects, particularly on the role of “new 
interest groups”. Therefore, I maintained contact with several helpful German 
professors and other experts who are referred to in this thesis.  
1.2.2 Construct validity and internal validity 
Construct validity has to do with “establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied” (Yin 2003:34). By developing adequate measures for the 
concepts to be studied, the researcher avoids the use of subjective judgments on 
which data to collect and collects only relevant data.  
Internal validity is a concern if the researcher tries to establish whether event 
x led to event y. To make causal inferences based on a single case study is difficult 
since other variables cannot be controlled for. The researcher needs to address rival 
explanations, and if he or she can make a convincing case that these explanations 
are inapplicable to the specific case, the internal validity is improved (Yin 2003:36).  
The problems of construct validity and internal validity will turn up with varying 
degrees of intensity in this thesis. Instead of discussing these topics here, I will 
address problems of validity in relation to concrete cases where it is relevant. 
1.3 The plan of the thesis 
Having presented the research question and sketched out the main content of the 
concepts old and new politics, the organization of the thesis will proceed as follows: 
In chapter two, I will give a presentation and definition of the German welfare state, 
before I trace its historical development. The background to and content of Agenda 
2010 is described, before I discuss what parts of the multifaceted reform program 
we can label welfare state retrenchment. In chapter three, I will present Pierson’s 
theories of blame avoidance and discuss whether the strategies of obfuscation, 
division and compensation were employed in the German case. Chapter four tests 
the theories of old politics and is divided into three parts: 4.1 is dedicated to the 
“logic of industrialism” argument, 4.2 to “new institutionalism” and 4.3 to the theory 
of “left power resources”. In the latter, I will also discuss the role of new interest 
groups. The two main parts of new politics are in other words treated separately – 
blame avoidance in chapter two and new interest groups in 4.3. In chapter five, I 
synthesize the discussions of the previous chapters when I return to the overarching 
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research question – can old or new politics best explain recent welfare state 
retrenchment in Germany? I also suggest modifications to the theories of new 
politics that I argue would improve the theory’s explanatory powers. 
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2. The history of the German welfare state  
and Agenda 2010 
In this chapter, I will describe the main characteristics of the German welfare state, 
before tracing its historical origins. To understand why Agenda 2010 came about, 
one must know the events leading up to it. I will also give a rather thorough 
description of the content of Agenda 2010, before discussing which parts of the 
program can be labeled retrenchment.  
2.1 Characteristics of the German welfare state 
According to Esping-Andersen’s classification, the German welfare state is close to 
the ideal of the “conservative” welfare state. In this model, the welfare state is 
developed by conservative political forces and aims to uphold status differences by 
attaching social rights to class or status rather than to “citizenship”. A strong 
Catholic impact is reflected in the commitment to the male breadwinner model, 
where social rights are extended to family members through the working husband. 
The subsidiarity principle implies that the state will interfere only when the family is 
not capable of taking care of its members (Esping-Andersen 1990:27).   
The conservative welfare state differs from the liberal and the social 
democratic model. Liberal welfare states are found in for example the United States 
and Australia, where liberal work ethic norms predominate. This results in primarily 
means-tested and modest social benefits, which are meant to encourage people to 
opt for work instead of welfare. The recipients of the benefits are mostly low-income, 
working class state dependents and the state encourages private welfare provisions 
(Esping-Andersen 1990:26). The social democratic regime-type is found in 
Scandinavia, where the Social Democrats promote universal welfare services and 
high quality benefits. Since benefits are graduated according to earnings, middle 
classes are kept content and private solutions through the market are crowded out 
(ibid:27-28). 
If we move from the comparative typology of Esping-Andersen and look at 
the meaning of the concept of welfare policy within a strictly German context, it first 
and foremost refers to social- and labour market policies, and excludes education 
policy (Pilz 2004:16). This frame of reference will also apply to this thesis. In a 
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narrow definition, the most essential elements of German “social policy” are the four 
pillars of insurance; pension-, unemployment-, health- and long-term care insurance 
(Streek and Trampusch 2004:176). This narrow definition focuses on “old social 
risks” in contrast to the “new social risks” related to socio-economic transformations 
taking place in postindustrial societies (Bonoli forthcoming).4 Also excluded are 
insurance against occupational injuries, state housing as well as some aspects 
included in other definitions (i.e. Mosebach 2005a:134; Pilz 2004:17; Schmidt 
1998:17).  
Pilz does not specify what is included in “labour market policy”, but 
presumably, it includes politics regarding the eligibility rules and size of the 
unemployment benefits, in addition to services offered to unemployed individuals. In 
this sense, labour market policy and social policy are somewhat overlapping. 
Excluded are border-line cases such as laws protecting against unfair dismissal and 
trade guild rules. 
The German welfare state is further characterized by the fragmentation of 
programs. Ultimate control over social insurance schemes rests with the respective 
ministries, but the administration and supply of services are carried out by numerous 
independent carrier organizations (Kassen). The carrier organizations are divided by 
type of benefit, geography (in the case of education and social assistance) and 
occupation group (workers, self employed, etc.) (Alber 1986:4). Through the 
principle of self-administration (Selbstverwaltung), the management consists of 
representatives of employers and employees; the latter are traditionally trade 
unionists (Mosebach 2005a:134).  
Social insurances are obligatory and contributions are mostly paid in equal 
parts by employees (deducted from the gross salary) and employers. Entitlements 
to benefits are earnings related and based on former contributions, rather than 
being linked to needs (Alder 1986:6). Tax-funding is of little, but increasing 
importance (Streeck and Trampusch 2005:176-179), and the state is not a 
significant service provider. Rather, income maintenance is achieved through cash 
benefits, which gives beneficiaries the choice of consumption and emphasizes the 
importance of private provision of services.  
                                              
4 New social risks are connected to the tertiarization of employment and the massive entry of women into the labor force. 
Examples of such risks include “reconciling work and family life”, “possessing low or obsolete skills” or “single 
parenthood” (Bonoli forthcoming). 
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2.2 The background to Agenda 2010 
Having sketched out some main features of the present day German welfare state, I 
will trace its origins in the next part, give a brief description of its development in the 
post-war period and elaborate on the prelude to Agenda 2010.  
2.2.1 The birth and development of the German welfare state 
Public social policy in Germany was born in the middle of the 19th Century, when the 
Prussian state headed by Otto von Bismarck tried to pacify the socialist workers 
movement by using a carrot-and-stick strategy. The stick was the Anti-socialist Law 
of 1878 that deprived Social Democrats and trade unionists the rights of assembly-, 
organization and publication, whereas the workers were to be won over by the state 
through public social insurance programs (Pilz 2004:25). As such, the birth of the 
social security system is not, as in other countries, attributable to democratic or 
revolutionary politicians.  
The three brands of the early German social security were the health 
insurance (1883), the industrial accident insurance (1884) and the old age and 
invalidity insurance (1889). These programs embodied the main principles 
elaborated on in part 2.1, which are still characteristic for the German social system 
(Schmidt 1998:25).  
After the World War I, the number of unemployed rose steadily, and during 
the Weimar Republic, unemployment insurance was introduced as a fourth pillar of 
social insurance. The basic system of social insurances survived the Nazi period 
despite extensive reform plans, and in the early 50s, the German economic miracle 
marked the end to the immediate post war period when recovery, reconstruction and 
alleviation of extreme poverty was the main focus of the social policy. The upswing 
allowed for an expansion of social policies, where extended service types 
incorporated ever larger proportions of the population (Pilz 2004:28-36). The share 
of the social expenses (Sozialbudget) of the national product increased 
correspondingly, from 26.2% in 1969 to 33.9% in 1975. The growth of expenses 
was largely financed through increases in the social contributions (Schmidt 
1998:95).  
In 1974/75, the period of economic prosperity ended, when the oil crisis and 
the worldwide recession hit Germany with force. The unemployment rate and the 
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number of people entitled to benefits increased, parallel with a decrease in the GDP 
and state revenues. The accelerating social expenses and aggravating economic 
situation led to a policy of cost-cutting (Sparpolitik). This marked the beginning of a 
development where, especially in the fields of unemployment benefits and pensions, 
benefits were cut and the needs and criteria for eligibility became increasingly 
stricter (Pilz 2004:38-39).   
Still, when Helmut Kohl and his coalition of the CDU/CSU and the FDP came 
to power in 1982, unemployment had reached a record level of 5.6% and the share 
of social expenses of the national product was 33.3%. The crisis of the social 
security system was an established fact (Pilz 2004:40). The new government 
continued the strategy of restrictive social policy, and the unemployed were hit 
particularly hard, due to benefit cuts and increased difficulties qualifying for benefits 
(Schmidt 1998:103).  
At the same time, the Standort-debate began, a debate which has been one of  
the major political themes in Germany ever since.5 The discourse and goal of the 
legislators revolved increasingly around improving Germany as a Standort by 
making the conditions for industry and business more flexible and favorable (Pilz 
2004:41). I will return to this in part 4.1. 
2.2.2 The unification 
After the unification in 1989, the costs of incorporating the literally bankrupt East 
Germany into the West German system of social insurance system added gravity to 
an already gloomy financial situation. The unification led to higher unemployment 
and an enormous increase in social spending, which was mainly financed through 
public debt and through pushing contribution rates to social security schemes higher 
(Liebfried and Obinger 2004:210).6 A common analysis of the situation points at the 
vicious circle of high social security contributions leading to inflated non wage labor 
costs that again depress the level of employment (Streeck and Trampusch 
2005:175). This is also elaborated on in part 4.1. 
                                              
5 It is difficult to translate the concept of “Standort” into English. “Standort” refers to the location where a company 
chooses to establish itself. The choice is affected by the different “Standortfaktoren”, such as geography, infrastructure, 
taxes, political stability, etc. The German “Standort”-debate refers to the debate on Germany’s position in the competition 
between different states or regions in attracting businesses (Schumacher and Volz 1998:239).   
6 The social expenditures’ share of the national product, rose from 30.7% in 1989 to 34.1% five years later (Liebfried and 
Obinger 2004:208). Total contribution rates increased from 35.9% to 39% during the same period (Streeck and Trampusch 
2005: 177).  
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From the mid-1990s onwards, with unemployment reaching the four million 
threshold in the winter of 1995-1996, the government decided on extensive reforms. 
Some measures had already been introduced to reform the social security system. 
Worthy of mention is the 1993 reform of the health system, which introduced 
competition in the German health care system by allowing persons subject to 
statutory health insurance to choose freely between sickness funds (Mosebach 
2005a:135). In 1994, this reform was succeeded by a compulsory, means tested, 
private long-term care insurance, which made up the fifth pillar of the social security 
system (Pilz 2004:44). With the “Program for Economic Growth and Employment” of 
1996, more far-reaching changes were implemented. Included in this program were 
the increase of co-payments in health care, the reduction of sick pay and cash 
sickness benefits, cuts in unemployment benefits and the abolishment of protection 
against dismissals in small-scale enterprises (Liebfried and Obinger 2004:211).  
Of concern was furthermore the aging population of Germany, which promised 
to expose the pensions system to profound fiscal stress.  As a response, pensions 
were reformed twice, in 1992 and 1997. The first reform was passed in cooperation 
with the opposition, but in 1997, the opposition objected to the “demographic factor” 
which would take life expectancy into account when calculating the benefits.7 The 
reforms were passed against the votes of the opposition, which added to increasing 
tensions between the government and the opposition. The SPD protested against 
the attacks on the welfare state, and promised to annul some of the measures if 
elected. This tactic contributed to their victory in the 1998 election, after which a 
Red-Green coalition of the SPD and the Green party was formed (Liebfried and 
Obinger 2004:211).  
2.2.3 The Red-Green government 
The government’s congruent majority in the Bundesrat and the Bundestag ended in 
February 1999 (Merkel 2003:170), but first, Schröder managed to pass laws that 
fulfilled his election promises. The demographic factor was suspended, the 
threshold value at which companies have to offer legal protection against dismissal 
was restored from ten to five employees and sick pay was restored to 100% 
(Schmidt 2003b:242). In addition, an ecological tax reform was legislated, which 
 14 
allowed pension contribution rates to decrease (Mez 2003:335). Concerning 
employment policy, the tripartite “Alliance for Jobs, Training and Competitiveness” 
was meant to be the government’s key instrument. This institution was charged with 
creating consensus between the social partners and the government concerning 
future reforms of the labour market (Zohlnhöfer 2004:111). 
After two waves of laws to annul Kohl’s retrenchment measures, as well as 
other examples of expansive fiscal policies (Beck and Scherrer 2005:202-206; 
Mosebach 2005b:163-164), the policies of the Red-Green coalition changed.  The 
change corresponded with the sudden resignation in March 1999 of the Keynesian-
minded finance minister Oscar Lafontaine and other like minded allies in the finance 
ministry, who had championed demand-side, redistributive policies (Beck and 
Scherrer:206). After Lafontaine’s resignation, more supply-side oriented policy 
prevailed: 
 
“(…) the year 1999 bore witness to a significant turnaround from progressive to regressive 
steps in economic, social and labor market policy. This implied not only a shift of relative risk 
and financial burden from capital to labor (…) but also a clear redirection of economic 
policies toward improving supply-side conditions and competitiveness” (Beck and Scherrer 
2005:208).   
     
The major pension reform of 2001 exemplifies the change of policies. During the 
election campaign, the SPD had protested against any cuts in the pensions (Pilz 
2004:129). However, the goal of the pensions reform was to decrease the 
replacement rate of the public pension from the present level of 70% to 64% in 
2030. The reductions were to be replaced by subsidized, voluntary private pensions, 
the Riester-Rente (Liebfried and Obinger 2004:212). This private pillar was 
something completely new in the German pensions system.  
The change in fiscal policy was not reflected in the area of employment policy 
until 2002, when the “traditionalist”, demand-side oriented unionist Walter Riester 
was replaced as labor minister by the “modernizer” and supply-side oriented 
Wolfgang Clement. Until that point, no major reforms were put on the agenda even 
though Schröder, during the election campaign of 1998, had announced that he did 
not deserve re-election in 2002 if his government did not bring unemployment down 
to 3.5 million (Zohlnhöfer 2004:111). By 2002, unemployment had soared to over 
                                                                                                                                           
7 Through the 19992 reform, pensions were tied to net instead of gross wages, retirement age was increased and pensions 
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four million (Süddeutsche 01.10.2003). Still, Schröder managed a marginal victory, 
much due to his popular stance against the war in Iraq and his handling of the 
catastrophic floods in Western Germany (Maier and Rattinger 2004:202). 
Before the election, a scandal in the Bundesanstalt spurred Schröder to 
appoint the Hartz commission in early 2002. This commission, charged with 
reporting on “modern services on the labor market” by August 2002, replaced the 
unsuccessful tripartite Alliance for Jobs. During the electoral campaign of 2002, 
Schröder bound his hands tightly when he promised to implement the Hartz report 
1:1. Although it was not eventually implemented on a complete 1:1 basis, the report 
formed the basis for the government’s reforms of the labour market (Dyson 
2005:234-237). The first two Hartz laws, Hartz I and II, were ratified on December 
20, 2002. Hartz I created Personnel Service Agencies, charged with placing 
unemployed people in temporary jobs, while Hartz II provided for the strengthening 
of the low-wage labour service sector through the creation of “mini- and midi-jobs”.8
At the beginning of 2003, the economic situation in Germany was depressive, 
with heavy unemployment weighing on public budgets and the government’s 
standing.  Still, the government was passive, and in February 2003, polls indicated 
that four out of five voters doubted that the government would undertake reforms to 
reduce unemployment (Frankfurter Allgemeine 02.16.2003). Voters were therefore 
taken by surprise when Schröder rather suddenly announced the Agenda 2010 
through a government statement on March 14, without having discussed his plans 
with his party. According to Geyer et al. (2004:249), the idea that a “great speech” 
(eine grosse Rede) was to be held in March was born only one month earlier. On 
February 17, the different political departments were given the assignment to figure 
out how to link cost-cutting measures with structural changes by the end of 
February. The short time limit allowed no time for discussions, votes or 
compromises, and SPD’s party fraction was only informed of the reform plans three 
days before the speech (ibid:250, 258).  
Traditionalist factions within the SPD and the Greens protested heavily against 
the reforms. Disgruntled parliamentarians even started the first inner party 
referendum in the history of the party, a socalled Mitgliederbegehren, in April 2003 
                                                                                                                                           
credits for studies at universities were cut (Liebfried and Obinger 2004:209). 
8 For a critical assessment of Hartz I and II, see Keller (2003). 
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(Geyer et al. 2005:266). The Mitgliederbegehren succeeded in forcing the SPD 
leadership to concede an emergency party conference where the reform proposals 
were discussed. However, they achieved no substantial results, as the 
government’s proposals were supported by 90% of the delegates through a party 
referendum.  
Having described its background, I will now turn to a detailed description of 
the center of the ado – Agenda 2010. 
2.3 Agenda 2010 
Agenda 2010 was an attempt to build a conceptive roof over the individual reforms 
that had already been discussed or implemented, their adjustments and the reform 
proposals that were yet to come. To limit the discussion, I will set the temporal 
demarcation to the reform proposals that were introduced as bills after the Agenda 
2010 speech on March 14, 2003. I exclude changes to the regulatory framework or 
adjustments to laws that were already passed. Included are reforms that were 
already under discussion, but that had not been voted on yet, like the health reform, 
labour market reforms and tax reforms  Thus, Agenda 2010 includes the acts below, 
which are also listed in table A1 in the appendix, where the numbers in the third 
column correspond to the numbers in brackets to below.  
Health. The health reform (number 2) was a result of negotiations between 
the government and the opposition, and most measures came into force on January 
1, 2004. The goal was to prevent an increase in the contribution rate to 15% in 
2004. Through this reform, patients are charged a quarterly fee of ten euros if they 
visit a doctor or a dentist. For hospital stays, patients are charged ten euros a day 
for a maximum of 28 days per year, and between five to ten euros per package of 
medicine.9 Surcharges for most services, medicines and hospital stays were raised 
and some goods and services, including non-prescription drugs, were removed from 
the reimbursement catalogue of public health insurance.10 Further, the insurances 
for dentures, bridges and sick benefits (Krankengeld) were shifted over to the 
                                              
9 The price depends on the price of the package. The maximum limit for additional payments is set to two percent of the 
gross income, one percent for the chronically ill ( The Federal government:14). 
10 The complete list of goods and services removed from the reimbursement catalogue includes spectacles for adults, 
artificial fertilisation, payments from the public health insurance companies in case of the death of a spouse and the 
reimbursement of free prescription  medicines (Grabow 2005:55). In addition, non-insurance benefits, such as funeral 
allowances and one-off childbirth benefits have been abolished (Beck and Scherrer 2005:210). 
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employees who were obliged to pay a separate premium for dentures and bridges 
from 2005 and for sick benefits from 2006 (Grabow 2005:55-57).11 An increase in 
the tobacco tax (number 12) financed federal subsidies of the health care. These 
measures led to a decrease in the contribution rate from an average of 14.3% in 
2003 to 13.6% in 2004 (Streeck and Trampusch 2005:177, 189). 
Pensions. The government had already reformed the pensions through the 
“Riester Rente” in 2001, which laid the ground for partly privatized pensions and 
provided for a reduction of the replacement rate (Pilz 2004:170-180). To keep the 
contribution rate at the desired 19.5% and reduce the deficit in the pensioners’ 
insurance fund, further “emergency” acts (Rentennotpaket) were introduced in late 
2003 (number 13-16) (Pilz 2004:217). The measures provided for a pension freeze 
(Nulllrunde) in 2004, and from April the same year, the disbursement of pensions 
was shifted from the beginning of the month to the end. In addition, pensioners had 
to cover the full costs of nursing care insurance instead of sharing them with the 
state pension funds (The Federal Government 2004:16-17).12 Finally, the fluctuation 
reserve of the statutory pension insurance system was reduced from 50% to 20%. 
These measures amounted to a net pension cut of 0.85% in 2004 (Streeck and 
Trampusch 2005:182). 
Labor policy and unemployment insurance. To reform the labour market, 
some of the recommendations made by the Hartz Commission were passed into 
law. Employment protection for small firms was relaxed, as businesses were 
allowed to employ up to ten people instead of five without having to offer legal 
protection against unfair dismissal (number 3). Further, the Federal Employment 
Service (BA) was restructured and renamed the Federal Labour Agency (a reform 
referred to as Hartz III, number 6 in table A1) (The Federal Government 2004:12).  
Hartz IV (number 7) is for many people synonymous with Agenda 2010 and it 
is the measure that has caused the greatest stir. This reform combined the 
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) and the social assistance (Sozialhilfe) 
into the flat-rate unemployment benefit II, ALG-II (Arbeidslosengeld II), which is 
given to employable job seekers. Unemployable individuals still receive social 
assistance, which is now labeled Sozialgeld (Winkel and Nakielski 2004:24). 
                                              
11 In case of illness, the employees had to finance the expenses alone from the seventh week, and in case of dentures, this 
was no more covered by the obligatory general health insurance (Pilz 2004:198-199).   
12 Because of the reform, pensioners have to pay 1.7% of their gross pensions instead of 0.85%. 
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Recipients of the ALG-II are paid a flat rate of 345 euros in the West or 331 
euros in the East, an improvement from 296/283 euros for people formerly receiving 
social assistance (Bäcker and Koch 2004:90).13 Previous receivers of the 
unemployment assistance were to varying degrees worse off, as this benefit was 
based on former net income. The duration of the unemployment benefit was 
shortened to 12 months (18 months for unemployed people over 55), down from a 
maximum of 32 months, after which the unemployed receive the ALG-II (number 4) 
(Pilz 2004:146). The costs and administrative responsibility for the ALG II are 
principally covered at federal level by the Federal Labor Agency, which means that 
they took over the responsibility for around one million employable recipients of 
social assistance from the municipalities (Pilz 2004:204).14 However, the 
municipalities had the option to take over the administrative responsibility if so 
desired (Winkel and Nakielski 2004:19).  
The Hartz reforms made labor market policy more “activating” by increasing 
incentives to work and putting greater pressure on the unemployed. The duty to 
accept any job offered, regardless of the wage paid or qualification requested, was 
strongly tightened (number 9). In other words, they must not be paid at rates 
customary in a place (ortsübliche Lohnen) (Bäcker and Koch 2004:95).15  As for the 
reforms of the health care and pensions, a desired result for the reforms of the 
unemployment benefits was to cut the contribution rate, but in contrast to health and 
pensions, no benchmark for the contribution rate was set.  
Tax reform. The tax reform introduced in 2000 provided for a three-stage 
reduction of taxes in order to encourage investment and stimulate consumption (The 
Federal Government 2004:9). The third phase of the tax reforms scheduled for 2005 
was partly advanced to 2004 (number 5), including reductions of the income tax 
rate, the top rate and an increase in the basic tax allowance. These reforms 
composed a tax cut of a total of 15 billion euros (ibid). In addition, subventions for 
homeowners and commuters were cut (number 5) (Pilz 2004:213), and a law to 
encourage the return of illegal earnings from abroad was passed (number 9) (Siems 
2003). 
                                              
13 The rules are of course more complicated. Reasonable costs for rent are for example covered, and contributions are 
increased if the receiver is responsible for children or spouse (Bäcker and Koch 2004).   
14 Exceptions are accommodation costs that were covered by the municipalities (Winkel and Nakielski 2004:19). 
15 The principle that wage levels should not violate the “bonos mores” (Die Sittenwidrigkeit) makes out the lower wage 
limit. This means around 30% under the wages customary in the place (Bäcker and Koch 2004:95). 
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The reform of communal finances provided for changes to the trade tax 
regulations, so that local authority were allowed to keep a larger amount of the trade 
taxes and thereby improve their financial situation (number 10) (Pilz 204:214). 
Finally, the trade guild rules were reformed (numbers 1 and 15) 
2.3.1 Welfare state retrenchment? 
Evidently, not all the aspects of Agenda 2010 described above are welfare state 
policies. Even though the measures on tax, trade guild rules and communal 
finances might eventually lead to better welfare services through an improved 
economic situation, they are not welfare state policies as such. The acts on 
pensions and health care, however, can clearly be described as welfare policy, 
according to the definition given in the introduction of this chapter. When it comes to 
labour market policy, policies that impact the unemployment benefits or services for 
unemployed are also welfare policies. This excludes the law on relaxed protection 
against unfair dismissal. 
The next question is if one can label these reforms retrenchment. Numerous 
articles discuss how one should and should not measure retrenchment, a discussion 
I do not intend to contribute to here. I will not use Pierson’s definition even though 
he is my theoretical departure, because I agree with critics that find it too vague 
(Alber 1996:6-7) and not very relevant to his blame avoidance perspective (Green-
Pedersen 2004:9).16   
Instead, I define retrenchment as significant reductions in benefits, stricter 
eligibility rules or qualitative reforms that make recipients worse off. Increases in or 
introductions of user fees (this applies especially to health care) or other strategies 
of privatizing the costs for welfare services is also retrenchment. What qualifies as 
“significant” will be left for a qualitative discussion. There is no absolute quantitative 
benchmark. 
Some of the reforms included in Agenda 2010 can clearly be labeled 
“retrenchment” according to this definition. This includes the reforms of the labor 
market, that make the unemployed worse off by reducing their benefits, by 
                                              
16 Pierson’s investigation focuses on quantitative data on expenditures and qualitative analysis of welfare state reforms that 
include structural shifts in the welfare state. These include: 1. Significant increases in reliance on means-tested benefits. 2. 
Major transfers of responsibility to the private sector and 3. Dramatic changes in benefit and eligibility rules that signal a 
qualitative reform of a particular program (Pierson 1996:157). 
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shortening the period during which benefits are paid and by making the eligibility 
criteria stricter. Furthermore, the health reform (except from the tobacco tax) is 
defined as retrenchment, while the pension cuts are harder to define, as these cuts 
are neither very significant nor permanent. Some changes are welfare state 
expansion rather than retrenchment. An example of which is the increase in social 
benefits due to the Hartz IV.  
How significant these reforms are, is a matter of discussion. The reforms of 
the unemployment benefit and the health reform come across as considerable. They 
are introduced as permanent changes (pending the political will to uphold them), 
and they signal qualitative reforms in contrast to the measures on pensions. Hartz 
IV provides for the ALG II, a completely new benefit, which implies substantially 
lower benefit levels for many of the unemployed. The increased costs for goods and 
services within the health sector signals a shift away from sharing the costs among 
all those insured to increasing the burdens on the users. This also indicates a 
qualitative change. The measures on pensions, especially the pensions freeze and 
the postponement of the disbursement of pensions, are rather single impact 
emergency measures than permanent cuts. The discussion will therefore focus 
primarily on the reforms of the unemployment benefit, to a lesser degree health 
care, and pensions are only included where relevant. This is also in line with the fact 
that the Hartz IV, as we shall see in part 4.3, caused the greatest public stir.  
Having presented the “dependent variable”, which is narrowed down to the 
parts of Agenda 2010 that can be labeled retrenchment, the subsequent chapters 
focus on the different theories that aim to explain the German retrenchment. First, I 
will discuss whether Schröder used blame avoidance strategies when retrenching 
the German welfare state.  
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3. New politics – the politics of blame avoidance 
3.1 Introduction 
After the golden age of the postwar economic boom ended in the early 1970s, the 
modern welfare states have entered a period of prolonged austerity (Pierson 
1996:143). This is reflected in a shift in political goals from expansion of the welfare 
state to retrenchment. The shift in goals and a radically changed context, consisting 
of the welfare state itself and general popular attachment connected to it, creates 
new political dynamics (Pierson 1996). 
Retrenchment imposes immediate and tangible losses for voters, in return for 
uncertain and diffuse benefits. In addition, a negativity bias, meaning that voters will 
react stronger to losses than to gains, increases the political risks connected to 
cutting down on welfare. Therefore, the policies of policy makers have shifted from 
“credit claiming” for popular programs, to “blame avoidance” for unpopular policies, 
which must withstand the scrutiny of voters and well-entrenched networks of interest 
groups (ibid:143-147). Blame avoidance consists of the political strategies of 
obfuscation, division, compensation and consensus-seeking (ibid:147). The latter is 
barely mentioned, in contrast to the other three strategies, on which Pierson 
elaborates. Therefore, in this chapter I will focus on the first three strategies of 
obfuscation, division and compensation when I ask whether the Red-Green 
government used blame avoidance strategies when pursuing retrenchment. The 
consensus-seeking aspect is included in part 4.2, where I discuss how the 
opposition shared responsibility for the reforms with the government and whether 
they also shared the blame. 
 
The hypothesis, which will be discussed in this part, is: 
3.N17: To avoid blame, the Red-Green government pursued the strategies of 
obfuscation, division and/or compensation when retrenching the German welfare 
state. 
                                              
17 To separate between hypotheses that are derived from old and new politics, I label new politics hypotheses ”N” and old 
politics-hypotheses ”O”. 
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In the following, I will elaborate on the strategies of obfuscation, division and 
compensation. Because Pierson gives several concrete and detailed examples of 
these strategies, which serve to operationalize the theoretical concept “blame 
avoidance”, I assess the concept validity as good.   
3.2  Theoretical concepts: obfuscation, division and 
compensation 
Obfuscation. The strategy of obfuscation originates in the unequal access to 
information, as responsible politicians have superior access to information in 
comparison to their opponents. This enables the government to lower the visibility of 
the reforms. Pierson’s argument of obfuscation builds on Douglas Arnold’s model of 
the voters’ “causal chain”. Arnold describes how voters, wanting to reward or punish 
politicians for positive or negative events, seek to reconstruct the causal chain from 
the events to the responsible politicians. First, they attempt to link these events to 
political choices; next, they want to reveal the connection between the choices and 
specific politicians or responsible parties.18 Politicians must therefore endeavor to 
complicate the reconstruction of the causal chain through obfuscation, which can 
take part at the three sites of the causal chain (Pierson 1994:20).  
 
Negative events Political choices Specific politicians or 
parties 
 
Figure 3.1 Douglas Arnold’s causal chain 
 
Obfuscation of the first part of the causal chain, the events, aims at lowering the 
salience of negative consequences. One tactic is to spread negative consequences 
widely or diffuse them over time. A second is decrementalism, an often pursued 
variant of which is failing to adjust benefits to inflation (ibid:20). Yet another tactic is 
“implicit privatization”, where benefits retain their real value, but play a diminishing 
role in the expanding economy because social provision is shifted increasingly 
                                              
18 Arnold and Pierson focus on politicians, which is justified in the political setting of the USA, where there is a stronger 
focus on individual politicians than in other industrialized countries (Fiorina et al. 2004:253). In Germany, this latter link in 
Arnold’s causal chain also should refer to political parties.  
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towards the private sector. Public attention and opposition is avoided because 
changes are highly incremental (ibid:20-21). 
The second causal link is between negative events and public policies. This 
link can be blurred by making the effects of reforms indirect, for example by 
imposing indirect taxes on hospitals that in turn increase prices. An alternative is to 
make the reforms so complicated that they avoid the media headlines (ibid:21). 
To decrease the traceability of policy makers’ responsibility for policy 
changes, the last part of the chain, politicians can impose changes in indexation-
rules. This leads to automatic, annual reductions and does not require a visible 
action from responsible politicians. Alternatively, politicians can diminish the 
traceability by delaying the implementation of cutbacks. A third option is to pass the 
blame and responsibility for imposing the cutbacks to local officials (ibid). 
Division. The second blame avoidance strategy is division. It denotes that 
retrenchment advocates will pursue divisive strategies by playing “one group of 
beneficiaries against another and develop reforms that compensate politically crucial 
groups for lost benefits” (Pierson 1996:147). By identifying different subgroups 
within a constituency of a public program, based on i.e. age, gender or income level, 
it is possible to isolate one subgroup within a potential opposition, and through the 
political ploy of “divide and conquer”, minimize the size of the opposition (Pierson 
1994:22-23). Although Pierson does not say so explicitly, commentators often add 
that the strategy is extra efficient if reforms “hit those groups hardest that are poorly 
organized and electorally harmless” (van Kersbergen 2000:99; similar arguments in 
Liebfried and Obinger 2004:215). An easy way of dividing the constituencies is by 
tightening the eligibility rules (Pierson 1994:23).  
Compensation. The third strategy for avoiding blame is compensation, 
directed at victims of reforms. This will diminish prospects for heated opposition 
from groups that might mobilize against reforms, or from those who might get public 
sympathy. One example is “Grandfather clauses” that spare those who are already 
receiving benefits so that cutbacks will hit future, unorganized recipients (ibid).   
3.2.1 Did Schröder obfuscate, divide or compensate? 
The popularity of the welfare state is a well-established “truth”, and its support is 
pronounced among the German voters. Padgett (2004:379-380) attributes the 
economic reform gridlock (prior to 2003) to the welfare state bias among German 
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voters (and parties). Survey data suggest that only a small minority of German 
voters would support welfare cuts, and most consider social differentiation as 
“unfair” (Padget 2004:374; 2005:254). The welfare bias cuts across party 
electorates, but the SPD, the PDS and the Green partisans are more supportive of 
the welfare state than those of the CDU/CSU. Only FDP partisans inhibit market 
preferences (Padget 2004:374). Against this backdrop, it is plausible that blame 
avoidance strategies are needed if the politicians wish to retrench the welfare state 
and concurrently avoid political defeat. 
Did the government pursue the blame avoidance strategies of “obfuscation”, 
“division” or “compensation” when they carried out the retrenchment included in 
Agenda 2010? Before discussing this question, I will shortly mention that the 
reforms presented above are results of compromises that were necessary for 
Agenda 2010 to pass the Bundesrat, where the opposition had the majority. This 
enabled the opposition put its imprints on parts of the reform package. A picture of 
reforms resulting from rational decision making, where avoiding blame was part of 
the government’s objective, could therefore be misleading. However, if we look at 
the details of the different reforms and at what the opposition managed to change, 
the measures we have labeled retrenchment were passed pretty much in their 
original form (Siems 2003). Hartz IV was largely unchanged19, and the pension 
emergency measures passed despite resistance from the opposition because they 
did not need Bundesrat approval (Spiegel 12.19.2003). The health reform was in its 
entirety a result of negotiations and compromise between the opposition and the 
government. Therefore, it is difficult to know which suggestions came from the 
government and which came from the opposition.  
3.2.2 Obfuscation 
With some good will, we can identify some examples of obfuscation. First, negative 
consequences were spread widely, as both pensioners, patients and unemployed 
were hit to varying degrees. These groups make up large parts of the electorate. On 
the one hand, this could diminish negative reactions if a feeling of fairness is created 
because “everyone has to take their share”. If small cuts affect many, this could 
hinder mobilization and cause less reaction than if one group had to face severe 
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cuts. On the other hand, directing the retrenchment towards larger groups could 
backfire because responsible politicians have to face larger groups of angry voters, 
if the cuts are serious enough to cause reactions. The severity of the cutbacks is in 
many ways a question of how they were received by those affected, an issue to 
which I will return in part 4.3.  
Was the tactic of decrementalism pursued in order to lower the salience of 
negative consequences? Failing to adjust for higher prices is an example of this 
strategy. Through freezing the pensions in 2004, they were not adjusted to inflation 
and consequently their real value decreased. This measure was bound to cause 
less of a stir than a nominal cut in benefits. However, the pension freeze was a one-
time measure and the link to the political decisions was clear. In comparison, linking 
benefits to inflation instead of wages will lead to decremental reductions over time, 
which will blur the link to political decisions and responsible politicians. Although 
pensions could have been cut in more dramatic and obvious ways, the pension 
freeze could hardly be considered an example of obfuscation.  
Were effects made indirect by imposing costs on service providers who in 
turn increased prices? As table 3.1 demonstrates, this certainly was not the case. 
Only a minor part of the costs for the health care reform was carried by the 
administration and the pharmaceutical industry, while the consumers had to pay 
between 87-92% of the total costs. 
                                                                                                                                           
19 Except from the increased pressure on the unemployed to accept jobs at almost any wage, which was included because of 
pressure from the CDU/CSU during the negotiations in the Mediation Committee (Siems 2003).  
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Table 3.1 Scale and distribution of costs of the health care reform (in billion euros). 
                       Year 
Measure 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Reform costs transferred to people who are insured under the public health 
insurance scheme (due payers) 
    
Limitation of hitherto granted benefits: e.g. artificial fertilization, reimbursements in 
case of death of a spouse, refunds of prescription free medicine, restrictions in travel 
refunds 
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Individual payments for visiting doctors, hospital stays and medicine 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Private insurance of dental treatments (dentures and bridges) No 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Privatisation of wage compensation in the case of longer sickness (a) No No No 5 
Obligatory payments of pensioners who receive company pensions 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Increase of tobacco tax 1 2.5 4.2 4.2 
Subtotal 1 8.4 13.4 15.1 20.1 
Reform costs carried by due payers in percentage of the total (my calculations) 87 88 89 92 
Reform costs carried by administration and the pharmaceutical industry      
Public health care insurance companies (limitation of administrative and personnel 
costs) 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Industry (e.g. statutory prize control, less discount for traders, more tests for medicine 
prior to reimbursement) 
1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Subtotal 2 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Reform costs carried by administration and the pharmaceutical industry in percentage 
of the total (my calculations) 
13  12 11 8 
Total 9.7 15.2 16.9 21.9 
Source: Der Spiegel 07.28.2003, in Grabow 2005:56. 
(a): This insurance was originally set to 2007, but later advanced to 2006. 
  
Furthermore, the measures were not complicated enough to avoid the headlines. 
True, not all aspects of the retrenchment were covered in depth and the media 
coverage on the emergency package for pensions was not as intense as that on the 
Hartz IV or the health reform.20 However, this was rather due to the severity and 
comprehensiveness of the measures than to their complexity. Pensions freeze and 
shifting of payments are easily communicable. 
Another obfuscation strategy is delaying cuts. Even if not all cutbacks were 
imposed immediately after the bills were passed, there are no examples of serious 
delays in the German case. The health reform and Hartz III were made effective 
from January 2004, and Hartz IV from January 1, 2005. A transition period applies 
to “older” employees for the shortened duration of the unemployment benefit. This 
means that it will fully apply to all those claiming unemployment benefits from 
February 2006 onwards (Bundesregierung.de). This delay is however not likely to 
hide political responsibility as all changes were scheduled within the government’s 
(original) end of term, set in the fall of 2006.  
According to Pierson, blame can be avoided by transferring responsibility for the 
implementation of cutbacks to local officials. The structure of self-administration of 
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the different insurance carriers (Kassen) implies that the responsibility for the 
implementation of political decisions is moved from the political arena to the arena 
of the self-administered carriers. This might also mean that the blame for unpopular 
policies is shifted. According to Bandelow and Hassenteufel (forthcoming), doctors 
make the government, the associations of National Health doctors (Kassenärtzliche 
Vereinigungen) and the sickness funds (Krankenkassen) responsible for policy 
outcomes. 21 The same might apply to the patients or other welfare consumers – the 
government could more easily avoid blame in such a decentralized system of self-
administered carriers, than if services were public and financed entirely through 
taxes. However, I would assume that the voters rather blamed the politicians than 
the insurance carriers for the reforms included in Agenda 2010, but a reliable 
investigation of this assumption requires survey data.  
As mentioned in chapter two, the system of self-administered carriers and 
decentralization goes back to the birth of the German welfare state. Was more 
responsibility decentralized through Agenda 2010? The Hartz reforms did change 
the administration and financial responsibility of unemployment benefits. However, 
instead of decentralizing, more responsibility was given to the Federal Employment 
Agency, because employable former recipients of social assistance were moved 
from municipal to federal jurisdiction.  
3.2.3 Division 
Liebfreid and Obinger (2003:215) found some evidence that the strategy of division 
was pursued in the 1990s because asylum seekers and immigrants from the former 
Soviet Unions were the ones who faced the hardest cuts. Concerning Agenda 2010, 
retrenchment will hit most voters in one way or the other. However, the main target 
of the reforms was the high unemployment, and consequently the unemployed were 
those who suffered the greatest through reduced benefits and a shortened 
subscription period to the unemployment benefit. They are at any rate the ones who 
have voiced the most visible protests (see 4.3).  
                                                                                                                                           
20 A search in the newspaper database Lexis Nexis proves that a search on “Rentennotpaket” results in 51 hits, while a 
search on “Gesundheitsreform” and “Hartz IV” during the same time period exceeds the limit of 3000 articles. 
21 Specific doctors (Kassenärtzte) and hospitals have agreements with the different health insurance carriers through which 
they are obliged to produce certain health care services. The doctors must be organized in associations (Kassenärtzliche 
Vereinigungen) which negotiate with the carriers. The carriers can not negotiate with individual doctors (Pilz 2004:104). 
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On the one hand, the unemployed are not the most resourceful group of 
welfare state recipients, and organizations for the unemployed have scant powers 
(Baumgarten 2003). However, the sheer size and potential votes of the unemployed 
should be powerful enough to intimidate retrenchment advocates. In 2003, German 
unemployment amounted to 11.6% (Arbeitsagentur.de1), but the share of Germans 
affected by the unemployment, and therefore the retrenchment, is of course larger. 
The German unemployed are in other words not electorally harmless. In addition, 
their interests are to a certain extent represented by the relatively powerful labor 
unions (Baumgarten 2003). It is interesting that recipients of social welfare benefits 
are better off because of the Hartz IV. This group is organizationally and electoral 
weak and could therefore have been an efficient target for cutbacks, if cutbacks per 
se were the goal.  
Did Schröder “divide and conquer” through tightening eligibility rules? The 
stricter rules on work availability requirements mean in effect that eligibility rules are 
tightened. If the unemployed refuse to accept available jobs, they are sanctioned 
through cuts or cessation of the unemployment benefits (Bäcker and Koch 2004:94). 
I doubt that this tightening of eligibility rules will have divisive effects in the sense 
that those who lose their claim on benefits because they refuse to take up available 
jobs are pitted against “rule abiding” recipients. Tightening eligibility criteria based 
on age or gender would have stronger divisive effects.  
The cuts in the unemployment benefits do not affect the constituency of the 
unemployed equally, as those above the age of 54 will receive unemployment 
benefits for 18 instead of 12 months before they receive the ALG-II. This could also 
not be considered a divisive strategy, as elder unemployed probably do not consider 
themselves spared from cuts. 
Regarding the pensions reform, only the new pensioners are hit by the shift of 
disbursement from the beginning to the end of the month. This could be viewed as a 
divisive strategy if one did not take into consideration that the “new pensioners” are 
future, unorganized groups that are unlikely to protest the favorable treatment of “old 
pensioners”.  
3.2.4 Compensation 
Pierson (1996:147) predicts that politically crucial groups will be compensated. The 
tax cuts are what most clearly taste of compensation. However, cuts are given to all 
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taxpayers, and are therefore not a concrete compensation to the potentially 
important groups of unemployed and retired voters whose tax payments per 
definition are limited. Only the taxpaying “patients” are compensated, who make up 
a large group of the electorate. For the unemployed, little compensation is offered. 
True, some changes could be perceived as improvements. For example, increased 
supplementary income will be permitted; the restructuring of the Federal 
Employment Service is expected to provide better and more personalized services 
for the unemployed and their family situation is supposedly better attended to (The 
Federal Government 2004:12). However, the compensating character of these 
changes, whose overall goal is to push the unemployed into the labor market, 
appears rather limited in comparison with the cuts the unemployed face.  
Shifting the payment of pensions from the beginning of the month until the 
end only for new pensioners could be seen as a modest example of a grandfather 
clause. This spared present recipients, who might mobilize against the real cutbacks 
through pensioners’ organizations like the small party die Grauen (see pg. 71). The 
ones who were hurt were unorganized, future pensioners. The cutbacks were 
however relatively modest singular impact measures and not likely to create much 
opposition. Besides, they were a part of a pensions’ emergency package that 
affected all pensioners.   
3.3 Conclusion – did Schröder use blame avoidance strategies? 
Based on the former analysis, I would argue that the Red-Green government did not 
use the blame avoidance strategies discussed by Pierson. Quite the contrary, most 
policies had immediate and concrete effects on voters. Instead of providing for a 
phasing in of the cuts in the unemployment benefits through an extended time 
period, the cuts were made effective from January 1, 2005. Rather than going 
through “the back door” by imposing cutbacks or indirect taxes on hospitals and 
doctors, politicians imposed most of the burden of the health reform on the patients 
through fees and surcharges. Even though the lack of blame avoidance strategies 
would logically make it harder for the government to avoid blame, applying such 
strategies involves drawbacks that make it rational not to pursue them (Pierson 
1994:24-26). The “emergency measures” on the pensions were per definition 
designed to cut costs immediately; therefore obfuscating the cutbacks through 
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decrementalist strategies would be meaningless. The same applies to the cuts in 
unemployment benefits - if the government wanted immediate payoffs from the labor 
market policies, it was rational not to delay cuts. Further, if Schröder wanted to 
demonstrate to skeptical voters who doubted his ability to pursue reforms that he 
was capable of acting on the unemployment, obfuscating his actions would be 
irrational. 
Compensation also has drawbacks, because it involves costs that might 
cannibalize budgetary savings. Blame avoidance strategies can also create 
bureaucratic complications if for example division implies that different groups have 
to be treated differently (Pierson 1994:25).  
All in all, the general lack of blame avoidance strategies allows me to reject 
Pierson’s claim that retrenchment is blame avoidance (Pierson 1996:179). However, 
if we extend Pierson’s arguments, his theory implies logically that a government that 
retrenches the welfare state without using blame avoidance strategies will simply 
have difficulties with avoiding blame among voters. According to Pierson (1996:145-
147), concrete losses in return for diffuse and uncertain benefits in the future will 
provoke protests from concentrated voter groups attached to social programs. We 
can expect that most voters who were hurt by the cutbacks were well aware of the 
retrenchment process. It is anticipated that they managed to link cutbacks to 
concrete policies; they were not impeded by division and were not soothed by 
compensations. However, as I mentioned above, there is one variant of blame 
avoidance that has not been discussed here – namely consensus-seeking. In part 
4.2, I will discuss whether the fact that the government sought consensus on the 
reforms could result in an obfuscation of the link between Agenda 2010 and 
responsible politicians, meaning that the government could share the blame with the 
opposition. In the concluding chapter five, the theme is pursued further and 
synthesized. There, I pursue further the question of why Schröder did not pursue 
strategies of blame avoidance. 
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4. Old politics – limits of existing theory? 
Pierson briefly discusses three existing theories of welfare state expansion that we 
have labeled old politics; “the logic of industrialism”, “the power resources 
perspective” and “new institutionalism”. Pierson’s overarching argument is that you 
cannot use the converse of these arguments to explain retrenchment, because the 
expansion of the welfare state has changed the context around social policy to the 
extent that new theoretical approaches are needed (Pierson 1996). In this chapter, I 
will test Pierson’s argument when I discuss whether inverted versions of the old 
politics theories can explain the case of German retrenchment. The question of 
whether or not these three theories can explain the expansion of the German 
welfare state will be excluded from the discussion.22  
Pierson formulates several alternatives of what the converse of the old 
theories would imply for the research on welfare state retrenchment. Many of his 
formulations and discussions of empirical implications are vague and not very 
detailed, which makes it difficult to apply them to an analysis of an empirical case. In 
this thesis, I will concentrate on the arguments that he has formulated the most 
concisely and develop concrete hypotheses, which I will test on the German case of 
retrenchment.   
4.1 The logic of industrialism and retrenchment 
4.1.1 Introduction 
The earliest theory of welfare state growth is the “logic of industrialism”-theory. This 
theory stresses the relationship between industrialism and welfare state expansion. 
It is deterministic in the sense that it implies that strong economies produce strong 
welfare states. Therefore, this theory is better at explaining why we find welfare 
states in rich nations and not in poor ones than at accounting for differences among 
western welfare states (Pierson 1996:148).  
Versions of this argument have been used to explain contemporary welfare 
politics, where the effects of global economic change are in focus. The argument on 
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which Pierson concentrates is a version of economic determinism focusing on social 
dumping.23 The line of reasoning is that globalization has increased the exit options 
for mobile capital, enabling firms to undertake social dumping, which means 
operating where “social wages” are low. The concept of “social wages” is not 
defined by Pierson, but according to the Institute for German industry, the term 
refers to costs not connected to direct hourly wage and includes employers’ 
contributions to social insurances, continued payment of wages in case of illness, 
holiday pay and other social benefits at company level (Institut der Deutschen 
Wirtshcaft Köln 2002:5).  
Firms that relocate can undercut the prices of their competitors and might 
force them to move or to close down. Alternatively, governments are pressured to 
cut social wages in order to prevent companies from moving abroad and generally 
improve their competitiveness. This might lead to a “race to the bottom” between 
national welfare states, over time leading to lowest-common-denominator welfare 
states (Pierson 1996:148). 
Pierson dismisses this argument, due to limited evidence. The social wage is 
one among many factors (i.e. infrastructure and worker productivity) that investors 
take into consideration when deciding where to establish their businesses (Pierson 
1996:149). The economic deterministic scenario leaves no room for politics or 
ideology, which is assumed to be subordinated to the market forces (Kittel and 
Obinger 2003:21). Pierson, however, will not leave out political forces as a 
mediating variable: “Even if social dumping arguments proved valid (...) much would 
still depend on the balance of political forces favoring and resisting a substantial 
restructuring of the welfare state” (ibid:149). He concludes that “claims of economic 
determinism pay insufficient attention to the politics of policy change”, and “policy 
outcomes cannot be derived directly from economic trends” (ibid:150).  
To assess the explanatory power of the inverted version of the logic of 
industrialism, I will discuss the following hypothesis: 
                                                                                                                                           
22 For a discussion on the expansion of the German welfare state from an institutionalist angle, see Manow (2004), who 
discusses the impact of federalism on the expansion of the welfare state. For a sociological account, see van Kersbergen 
(1995), who discusses the role of Christian Democracy in the development of the welfare state.  
23 Pierson also mentions another version of economic determinism which claims that “globalization of capital markets 
removes crucial economic policy tools from national governments and constrains social policy options” (Pierson 
1996:148). This argument is however not developed into details, therefore I concentrate on the “social dumping” version of 
economic determinism.  
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4.1.O: High social wages lead German firms to operate where social wages are low. 
Relocation has negative employment effects which pressures the government to cut 
social wages. 
 
Evidently, I will limit the discussion to the aspect concerning the pressure on 
governments to reduce social wage costs. The issue of whether or not prices of 
competitors are undercut or higher-cost firms go out of business will be excluded 
from the discussion. The figure below illustrates the hypothesis: 
 
 High social 
wages 
Relocation Reforms to reduce 
social wages 
Negative 
employment 
effects  
Figure 4.1 Economic determinism 
4.1.2 Theoretical concepts, operationalizations and validity 
Before I start discussing the hypothesis, I must ensure that I operate with concrete 
and measurable concepts. That is, I must discuss construct validity.  Also, since I try 
to establish causal links between event X and event Y, the internal validity of such 
links must be assessed. 
According to Pierson, the term social dumping refers to:  
 
“ (…) the possibility that firms operating where “social wages” are low may be able to 
undercut the prices of competitors, forcing higher-cost firms either to go out of business, or to 
relocate to low social wage areas, or to pressure their governments to reduce social wage 
costs” (Pierson 1996:148). 
 
I would argue that the theoretical concept of “social dumping” is limited to 
relocations driven by high social wages, the first chain in figure 4.1, whereas the 
consequences of social dumping (the second and third chain in figure 4.1) are 
excluded from the concept. The next question is: How do we measure social 
dumping?  
Relocations due to high social wages is only one variant of foreign 
investments. This is a wider concept including operations abroad to develop or open 
up new markets or to build up sales capacities and customer services abroad (DIHK 
2003:1). Given this, conducting surveys of motivations for investing abroad is the 
only way to measure social dumping (Beyfuss and Eggert 2000:20).  Although the 
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face validity of this operationalization is good, surveys of motivations are not without 
problems, because it is difficult to isolate the various motivations behind investing 
abroad. Usually, firms are motivated by a bundle of reasons (Beyfuss and Eggert 
2000:21). In surveys of motivation, the respondents are therefore allowed to 
mention several reasons for investing abroad (ibid:33). The plurality of motivations 
weakens the internal validity of the first causal link of figure 4.1 between high social 
wages and relocation of industry. 
The conceptual difference between general foreign investments and 
relocation is also important because the differences in motivations mirror partly 
contrasting consequences for domestic employment. When German companies 
invest abroad to find new markets or to strengthen their sales department, it does 
not necessarily have negative consequences for German employment. On the 
contrary, such activities might have positive effects for German exports. However, 
investments motivated by high costs are likely to replace German jobs 
(Henneberger and Graf 1996:11). Therefore, relocation of industry might pressure a 
government to improve the disadvantages of location (Standortnachteile), for 
example by cutting social wages. 
The interconnection of motivations makes, in turn, a valid and unambiguous 
measurement of the effect of relocation of industry on employment difficult; the 
second causal link of figure 4.1. If a company invests abroad both to avoid high 
social wages, which probably has negative effects on employments, but also to find 
new markets, which might have positive effects, the net effects on domestic jobs are 
ambiguous (ibid:21).24 In addition to various methodological problems (ibid:14), it is 
fair to assume that the answers given by the managers on investment motives are 
influenced by public opinion (ibid). The internal validity of the causal relationship 
between relocation and employment effects is in other word rather weak. Taking 
these considerations on methodological difficulties into account, surveys of 
motivation conducted by the Institute for German Industry can indicate to which 
                                              
24 The negative effects of genuine relocations are also open to debate. Relocation carried out by the Volkswagen-group 
serves as an example of how removal of industry does not necessarily have unambiguous negative consequences for 
domestic employment. According to Spiegel (04.26.2004), cheap production of cars in Slovakien, Hungary, Poland and the 
Tscheck Republic, enables Wolksvagen to sustain the higher costs in Wolfsburg, Emden and Ingolstadt (in Germany). 
Thus, relocation might have an indirect, positive effect on employment. Another argument is that exported jobs are often 
unsustainable, and would at any rate disappear from the domestic labor market if they were not relocated (Henneberger and 
Graf 1996:12).   
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extent high labor costs are considered a problem serious enough to relocate 
abroad.  
When assessing the third causal link of figure 4.1, between the employment 
effects of relocation and reforms included in Agenda 2010 aimed at cutting social 
wages, I am confined to discuss whether arguments for reforms presented by the 
government have been connected to “reduced competitiveness” and “removal of 
industry” due to labor costs. I would argue that the internal validity of the third causal 
link is relatively strong. Arguments for cutting social wages are usually connected to 
negative employment effects for German enterprises. On the one hand, high wages 
inflate prices and decrease the competitiveness of German exports, while on the 
other hand, high wages lead to relocation of German industry. Taking into 
consideration that cuts in social wages through cutting social contributions lead to 
fiscal problems for the affected welfare schemes, there are arguably few other 
reasons to cut social contributions than the negative employment effects they have.  
I would argue that the operationalization of the theoretical concepts “social 
wages” and “social dumping” are valid, but difficulties with isolating the causal effect 
of social wages on foreign investments and of social dumping on employment 
decrease the internal validity of these causal links.  Having discussed central 
concepts, I will proceed with discussing the empirical case. Since the cause, “social 
dumping”, appears before the consequence, “reducing social wage costs”, I will limit 
my discussion to economic activities taking place after the government was elected 
in 1998 and before the presentation of Agenda 2010 in March 2003.  
4.1.3 German social wages 
The strength of German international competitiveness is a disputed matter. 
Depending on which factors are emphasized and whether the competitive situation 
is assessed from a dynamic or static perspective, commentators draw different 
conclusions. Some view German competitiveness as relatively weak (i.e. Kitschelt 
and Streeck 2004; Löbbe 2002), others claim that this weakness is exaggerated (i.e. 
Beck 2005; Schumacher and Volz 1998; Streeck and Trampusch 2005).25
The high social wages (or non-wage labor costs) are however undisputed, 
and belong to Germany’s, especially West Germany’s, most serious Standort-
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handicaps. Comparative studies on industrial competitiveness indicate that 
Germany occupies the last position on non-wage and total labor costs (as well as 
effective working time), while they perform relatively well on other Standort-factors 
(i.e. industrial peace, productivity) (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln 2002; 
2005).26 The statutory social security contributions inflate the labor costs. In 2002, 
they unemployment contribution rate equaled 6.5%, pension 19.1% and the health 
care contribution rate 14.0%, adding up to over 40% of gross wages (Streeck and 
Trampusch 2005:29).27
Having established that non-wage labor costs in Germany are high, the 
discussion will now focus on the consequences of the high social wages. Is there 
any link between social wages and “social dumping”? 
4.1.4 Do high social wages lead to relocation of industry and negative 
employment effects? 
The production by German enterprises abroad (as well as import) is an evidence of 
foreign location site superiority (Standortvorteile) (Borrmann et al. 2001:71). Macro 
statistics indicate that there has been an obvious development from foreign trade 
towards production in foreign countries, which implies that Germany is losing 
attractiveness as a production site. In 1980, Germany exported twice as much as 
they produced abroad28, while in 1998, the export equaled the production (ibid). To 
what extent does this trend towards production in foreign countries reflect high non-
wage labor costs? 
The only recent sources I have at my disposal to illuminate this question are 
surveys conducted by The Association of German Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce (DIHK) on removal of industry, conducted in December 1999 and 
January 2003.29 According to these surveys, 21% of western German 
                                                                                                                                           
25 See i.e. Borrmann et.al (2001), Fitzenberger et al. (2004) and particularly Löbbe et.al (2002) for detailed discussions of 
German competitiveness and Standort Deutschland.  
26 In 2000, a comparative study of industrial sectors shows that West German employers paid on average an additional 81% 
of the direct salary for social contributions, giving Western Germany the first rank among 22 OECD countries when it 
comes to non-wage labor costs and total labour costs (Institut der deutschen wirtschaft Köln 2002:3). A later comparative 
study ranked the hourly German labor costs (of 27,09 Euro per hour) as the third highest, behind Norway and Denmark 
(Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln 2005:5) 
27 The exact contribution rate was 41.3 %. The long-term care contribution rate was 1.7% from 1996 (Streeck and 
Trampusch 2005:29). 
28 Measured in billion German ”Mark”. 
29 Although the surveys contain data from 1993, 1996 and 1999, I will only refer to the surveys from 1999 and 2003, under 
the assumption that developments closest in time to Agenda 2010 had the greatest impact on the Red-Green government’s 
policies. The latest survey was published on May 26, that is after the announcement of Agenda 2010, and the survey and 
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manufacturers planned to relocate their production in the fall of 1999, and in the 
beginning of 2003, 24% had the same intentions.30  
Even though intentions and threats to relocate might influence politicians and 
policies, more interesting is perhaps to which extent industry actually did relocate. In 
1999, 19% of industrial companies had relocated production, and 18% in 2003 
(DIHK 2003:5), proving a readiness to realize their intentions. In 2003, 45% 
answered that the main motive for wanting to relocate was the high German labor 
costs, sinking from 57% in 1999.31 High taxes were the second most common 
motive (ibid:6).  
The survey indicates a link between high social wages and relocation of 
industry. According to the results of the 2003-survey, the DIHK estimates that cost-
related relocation has yearly caused 45.000 jobs to move abroad (ibid:10). As 
discussed above, however, the reliability of such calculations is dubious. 
One might argue that the important aspect is not whether production sites and 
jobs actually are relocated, but rather that the globalization and integration of the 
world economy makes this possibility easier and more likely. The bare threat of 
moving abroad is a powerful tool for employers seeking to lower labor costs, and the 
worse the economic situation in the affected area, the more effective the threats. If 
the threat is perceived as credible, employers have the upper hand in wage 
negotiations, in comparison with unions, who are forced to commit to “concession 
bargaining”, or so-called “Bündnisse für Arbeit”. This means that unions admit to 
reducing or not raising salaries, or working more for the same wages, whereas the 
company management guarantees not to cut down on staff or to relocate 
(Henneberger and Kaiser 2000:43).32 The examples of such “pacts” for 
safeguarding production sites under the threat of removal of industry are manifold. 
One-fourth of German firms had negotiated a Bündnis in 2003 (Massa-Wirth and 
Seifert 2004:249). One example is the deal between management and employees 
of Siemens, in which Siemens-employees had to work five hours more every week 
                                                                                                                                           
the press coverage it caused could not have had causal influence on the government’s policies. However, I assume that the 
survey reflects tendencies in German economy somewhat known to the government, and will therefore also comment on 
the survey from 2003. 
30 In 2003 including West and East Germany,. 
31 According to DIHK (2003:5), the reason for the reduction of the importance of labor costs was that many companies 
already had relocated labor- and cost intensive production by 2003. 
32 Particularly multinationals and larger companies have the possibility of threatening with removal of industry, as small 
and medium sized companies lack the capital and experience needed to invest abroad (Henneberger and Kaiser 2000:43). 
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without increased salary. The management threatened with relocating the jobs 
abroad if the employees did not comply with the deal (Bloed et al. 2004). According 
to the logic of industrialism, social dumping enables firms to “pressure their 
governments to reduce social wage costs” (Pierson 1996:148). Instead, through the 
practice of Bündnisse für Arbeit, German employers are pressuring workers to cut 
real wages in order to prevent relocation.  
4.1.5 Did relocation pressure the government to cut social wages? 
Previously, I established that German industry is moving abroad (or threatening to 
move abroad) due to high social wages, and that this probably has negative 
employment effects. The discussion will now center on the third link in figure 4.1; 
between the removal of industry and negative employment effects and Agenda 
2010.  
The discussion will focus on whether the formal, official arguments for the 
reform presented by the government have been connected to “reduced 
competitiveness” and “removal of industry” due to labor costs, and which actions the 
government has taken to reduce labor costs.33 My sources are the government 
statement of March 14, 2003, through which Schröder presented Agenda 2010 
(Regierungserklärung.de), the official Agenda 2010-homepage (Grundideen-der-
Agenda-2010.de) and the Agenda 2010 leaflet, which was distributed to all German 
homes (The Federal Government 2004). It is fair to assume that the main reasons 
behind Agenda 2010 were articulated in these sources. However, the analysis of 
high labor costs leading to reduced competitiveness might be so internalized in the 
political discourse that it is not expressed explicitly anymore. This would reduce the 
value of analyzing official argumentation.  
According to the government statement and the Agenda 2010 leaflet, the goal 
of Agenda 2010 was to put Germany back in the lead of European economic and 
social progress. The present economical situation in Germany is analyzed, and the 
main economic problems and their causes are presented. Weak growth is identified 
as the main problem. This is also said to have structural causes, most importantly 
                                              
33 Studying lobbying or other pressure activities would arguably have been a more valid way of assessing whether ”the 
industry” has put pressure on the government to reduce non-wage labor costs. The scope of this paper restricts me from 
pursuing such an investigation.  
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high non-wage labor costs. For employers, these costs work as a hindrance against 
employment, and for employees, they have become an almost unbearable load: 
 
“Deutschland hat (…) mit einer Wachstumsschwäche zu kämpfen, die auch strukturelle 
Ursachen hat. Die Lohnnebenkosten haben eine Höhe erreicht, die für die Arbeitnehmer zu 
einer kaum mehr tragbare Belastung geworden ist und die auf der Arbeitgeberseite als 
Hindernis wirkt, mehr Beschäftigung zu schaffen“ (Regierungserklärung.de). 
 
 Although “social wages” are identified as a main problem, arguments for reforms 
are not explicitly connected to “removal of industry” in the statement. On the official 
Agenda 2010 web pages, however, removal of industry is mentioned explicitly as a 
motivational factor. High non-wage labor costs are again identified as one of 
German economy’s main structural problems, as a hindrance for employment and 
thus a hindrance for growth, and as a cause for removal of industry:  
 
“Die Lohnnebenkosten sind zu hoch. Das macht die Arbeit Deutschland zu teuer. Folge: 
Arbeitsplätze werden ins Ausland verlegt, wo es billiger ist – die Menschen bleiben in 
Deutschland ohne Arbeit zurück“ (Grundideen-der-Agenda-2010.de).  
 
In the Agenda 2010 leaflet, lower social wages is mentioned as one of the measures 
that needs to be taken in order to “secure Germany’s future“ (The Federal 
Government 2004:4): “Non-wage labour costs must remain at acceptable levels for 
both businesses and employees“ (ibid). There is no explanation as to why this is 
necessary. This could indicate that the analysis of the link between high social 
wages and employment is taken for granted. 
Social wages is in other words one of the expressed “official motives” behind 
Agenda 2010. Either it is argued on a general level that high social wages are 
considered a structural problem, which causes slow growth, or it is declared that 
social wages lead specifically to “removal of industry” due to high social costs. Did 
these concerns materialize in concrete measures aimed at cutting social 
contributions? 
The reduction of non-wage labour costs was an important issue on the 
government’s agenda even before the announcement of Agenda 2010. The main 
instruments to reach the goal of reducing social security contribution to less than 
40% of gross wages were the ecological tax reform and the Riester-Rente (see 
page 14)). However, the nullification of reforms introduced by Kohl (page 13) 
resulted instead in increasing non-wage labour costs (Zohlnhöfer 2004:113).  
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With Agenda 2010, further measures were introduced in order to curb non-
wage labor costs regarding contribution rates to pensions, health care and 
unemployment insurance. These changes were described in part 2.3, to which I will 
refer the reader for details.   
Some of the measures introduced are cuts had direct effects on contribution 
rates, like the pensions freeze of 2004. Others will only have long-term effects, such 
as those found in parts of the Hartz-reforms. At the time of writing, it is premature to 
draw conclusions on the reforms’ end effects on contribution rates. However, the 
important point in this regard is that the government did endeavor to reduce social 
wages.   
4.1.6 Conclusion - Did social dumping lead to cuts in social wages? 
This discussion has shown that German social wages are high and have led 
German firms to move abroad. Removal of industry due to high social wages 
probably has negative employment effects, but it is unclear exactly how many jobs 
are lost. It is also ambiguous how much pressure social dumping has put on the 
German government to cut non-wage labor costs. In the official statements in 
connection with Agenda 2010, arguments on “social dumping” were to a certain 
degree expressed. At any rate, it was only a part of the problem of the high non-
wage labor costs, which were perceived as a structural problem causing slow 
growth. 
The concerns about high social wages led to several policy measures aimed 
at lowering social contributions, such as the Hartz IV, the real cuts in pensions and 
the “privatization” of costs for goods and services in the health sector (see 2.3). Do 
these measures justify a claim that Germany is participating in a “race to the 
bottom”, the extreme scenario painted by the social dumping argument?  
The German welfare state has clearly a long ways to go before it reaches the 
“bottom”, but it is also evident that the economic analysis - where high social wages 
have negative consequences for German employment and therefore need to be cut 
-has a pronounced impact on German policies. It is further obvious that the efforts to 
cut social wages lead to cuts in social services (Sozialabbau). In chapter two, I 
noted how the social democratic agenda had changed towards “liberal”, supply side 
oriented policies. In other words, the SPD has moved towards the right in the 
spheres of economic and welfare policies. This indicates that “party color” is losing 
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its importance as an explanatory variable when it comes to explaining such policies. 
Although politicians still have the power to impact policies, a “deterministic” analysis, 
where politics loses its importance as a mediating variable between “globalization” 
and welfare state development, has gained explanatory power in the case of 
Germany.  
4.2 New institutionalism and retrenchment 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The new institutionalist approach to welfare state development has been 
concentrated around two broad claims. The first claim focuses on policy feedback 
effects - the consequences of previously introduced welfare state programs. Due to 
limited space and the fact that Pierson develops few explicit hypotheses on how to 
study policy feedback effects in single cases, I will not discuss this variant of the 
institutionalist approach. Instead, I focus on the second claim, which is illustrated in 
figure 4.2 - that strong states produce strong welfare states (Pierson 1996:152-153).  
State strength is defined in terms of “governmental administrative capacities 
and institutional cohesion. (…) Federalism, separation of powers, strong 
bicameralism or reliance on referenda all may restrict welfare state development” 
(Pierson 1996:152).  A straightforward application of this argument on retrenchment 
implies that the fewer the veto points, the stronger the concentration of power, the 
freer the government’s hands in reforming the welfare state. Diffusion of power will 
equivalently impede retrenchment. This argument equals old politics with regard to 
“new institutionalism”. 
Again, Pierson claims that you cannot use the converse of this argument to 
explain retrenchment, because the policy content is different. Cutbacks of welfare 
programs are unpopular, in contrast to their expansion. While concentration of 
power facilitates retrenchment, it is impeded by the concentration of accountability it 
logically implies. Diffusion of power (through strong veto points) will equivalently 
open up for diffusion of accountability, which will facilitate retrenchment, as 
illustrated in figure 4.2:  
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Figure 4.2. The effect of “state strength” on retrenchment 
 
In chapter three, I concluded that obfuscation strategies were largely absent, but 
promised to pursue the consensus-seeking strategy in this part. If the government 
sought (or had to seek) consensus on reforms, this could result in an obfuscation of 
the link between policy decisions and responsible politicians (the last chain of figure 
3.1), meaning that the government could share the blame with the opposition. The 
diffusion of power and accountability through consensus-seeking is in effect an 
obfuscation strategy. Therefore, I discuss whether the responsibility for reforms was 
obfuscated when discussing whether accountability was diffused. This link between 
consensus-seeking and diffusion of accountability is not made explicit by Pierson.  
The argument on concentration or diffusion of accountability is the new 
politics version of “new institutionalism”. Whether “concentration/diffusion of power 
effects” (old politics) outweigh “concentration/diffusion of accountability effects” (new 
politics) is an empirical question. Pierson opens up for both alternatives: “We are 
therefore left with the empirical question of whether concentration of power effects 
outweighs concentration of accountability effects” (Pierson 1996:154).  
 
The old politics hypothesis on the role of institutions is thus as follows: 
4.2.O: If power is diffused, diffusion of power effects outweigh diffusion of 
accountability effects, which impedes retrenchment. If power is concentrated, 
concentration of power effects outweigh concentration of accountability effects, 
which facilitates retrenchment.  
 
The rival new politics hypothesis is: 
4.2.N: If power is diffused, diffusion of accountability effects outweigh diffusion of 
power effects, which facilitates retrenchment. If power is concentrated, 
concentration of accountability effects outweigh concentration of powers effects, 
which hinders retrenchment.  
Strong 
states New politics: 
Concentration of 
accountability 
Old politics: 
Concentration of 
power + 
--
Retrench-
ment 
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The concepts included in the hypotheses – diffusion/concentration of power and 
diffusion/concentration of accountability – will be defined next.  
4.2.2 Theoretical concepts, operationalizations and validity 
Since Pierson gives a relatively concrete definition of the theoretical concept “state 
strength” (above), I assess the validity of this concept as good.  
In the federal state of Germany, the system of bicameralism can have a 
strong impact on decision-making. When the Bundestag (the lower chamber) and 
the Bundesrat (the upper chamber) are dominated by different majorities, as was 
the case during the Red-Green government’s second term, this can function as a 
powerful veto point. Strong bicameralism is the most important veto point among the 
constitutional veto powers referred to by Pierson, since the German president is 
weak (Schmidt 2003a:37), and nationwide plebiscites play no role (ibid:174-175).34 
Focusing on the Bundesrat as the principal veto power is also supported by other 
studies.35 In the German case, power is, in other words, diffused, not concentrated.   
The discussion of the “diffusion of power effect” will mainly be an assessment of 
whether the fact that parts of the reforms had to pass through the Bundesrat had 
any consequences for the content and pace of the reform. Diffusion of power effects 
existed if the opposition actively used their veto powers by blocking the reforms they 
were able to block, and/or if they were able to influence the content of reforms in 
order to give them their approval when the government needed the opposition’s 
consent.  
Even though Pierson does not have a clear and measurable notion of what is 
meant by the “diffusion of powers effect”, I would argue that this is a valid way of 
operationalizing the concept.  
According to Pierson, the hampering effect of diffusion of power also enables 
“diffusion of accountability”. On how to operationalize this accountability effect, he 
does not offer much help, but merely writes:  
                                              
34 The approval of constitutional veto players is required by law, in contrast to effective veto players, like trade unions, who 
might influence the decisions of the constitutional veto players (Merkel 2003:180-181). In order to focus the discussion, I 
will only consider the constitutional veto points listed by Pierson (1996:152-153), among which the German second 
chamber, the Bundesrat, is the only veto power of importance. The potential veto power of the trade unions is touched upon 
in part  4.3. One might argue that the Federal Constitutional Court also is an important constitutional veto player, but I will 
exclude this from the discussion. For an account on the political impact of the Constitutional Court, see Schmidt 
(2003a:117-118). For discussions on other veto players, see Schmidt (2003a:44-46) or Merkel (2003).   
35 For examples, see Bonoli (2001:242); Merkel (2003:167) (where there is a list of references to articles focusing on the 
veto power of the Bundesrat); Pierson (1996:167) and Schmidt (2003a:58). 
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“Where authority is centralized, the public knows that the government of the day can prevent 
groups from suffering cutbacks. Strong governments, anticipating the high political cost of 
retrenchment, may forgo the opportunities provided by concentrated power” (Pierson 
1996:154).  
 
In other words, the assumption that the government will be blamed might hinder the 
government from pursuing retrenchment. The causal link thus seems to be as 
follows (note that in the case of Germany, I concluded that power is not 
concentrated but diffused, which opens up for diffusion of accountability): 
 
 Concentration of 
power 
Assumption of 
concentration of 
accountability 
Restricted 
retrenchment  
 
Figure 4.3: Pierson’s notion of concentration of accountability 
 
Even though the hypothetical link above is probable, to discuss such a link 
empirically, which takes effect before any reforms are proposed, is difficult. I will 
therefore discuss “diffusion of accountability” by assessing whether the blame for 
the unpopular parts of Agenda 2010 (in particular Hartz IV) fell solely on the 
government, or if the opposition also took blows. Other analyses have chosen the 
same solution. Bonoli (2001) discusses five instances of welfare state reform, where 
the accountability effect apparently is operationalized by discussing which electoral 
consequences and informal protest the government encountered after having 
introduced the reforms. Such consequences come after the reforms are 
implemented and influence the success of the reforms rather than “encourage” or 
impede a government that is set on carrying through reforms. Evidently, the notions 
of “diffusion of accountability” on the theoretical level and the empirical level are not 
identical, which implies that the concept validity is low.   
Arguably, the most valid way to measure how individuals apportioned blame 
is to collect individual data. Lacking such data, I will operationalize the accountability 
effect by assessing to which extent the opposition and the government shared the 
blame for reforms in the following arenas: the press, elections, polls and 
demonstrations. The blame is shared if the popularity of both the government and 
the opposition decreases in polls and elections, and if the press and demonstrators 
accredit the blame for the reforms to both the government and the opposition.  
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On the one hand, results in polls and elections give reliable and quantitative 
measures. On the other hand, both the concept validity and internal validity of using 
voting data as a measure for “blame sharing” is low. This is because results in 
elections are indicators of the aggregate, general positions on the politics of each 
party, and other variables than the attitude towards retrenchment motivate the 
voters’ behavior in polls and elections.  
On the federal level, Agenda 2010 was the prime topic. If the voters’ position 
on Agenda 2010 was the main factor determining voter behavior, one could expect 
that well-informed, discontented and rational voters would turn away from the SPD, 
the Greens, the CDU and the FDP and vote for the PDS, which was the only party 
opposed to Agenda 2010 (next to the right wing parties). There is no individual data 
on such voters, but for some state elections, there is aggregate data on a sample of 
unemployed voters, which could approximate this voter type. One must however 
bear in mind that in state elections, state politics might be more salient than federal 
politics.  
In addition, the voting behavior of East German voters is of interest. 
Unemployment is much higher in the East than in the West, which means that East 
Germans are more affected by the Hartz IV than the West Germans.  
The demonstrations were direct reactions to the retrenchment. Measuring how 
participants in demonstrations apportioned the blame is therefore a valid way of 
operationalizing “diffusion of accountability”. Since I lack individual data, I will study 
newspaper articles and demonstrators’ slogans. Because I conduct no systematic 
and scientific analysis of slogans and press coverage, the reliability is low. The 
same is true of the analysis of newspaper articles – the articles I study do not make 
up a representative sample of all articles covering Agenda 2010.  
Bearing these difficulties with validity and reliability in mind, I will move on to 
discussing the diffusion of power and diffusion of accountability effects. To 
understand why incongruent majorities in the houses of parliament can have 
diffusion of power effects, a short introduction to the German parliamentary system 
is required. 
4.2.3 German institutions and the role of the Bundesrat  
In Germany, the legislature is divided into an upper house, the Bundesrat, and a 
lower house, the Bundestag. The states are represented in the Bundesrat, the 
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Federal Republic in the Bundestag. All bills that directly affect the interests of the 
states have to pass through the Bundesrat. This concerns around 50% to 60% of all 
bills (Schmidt 2003a:58).  
On appeal from the federal government or either house of parliament, 
disputed legislation is passed on to the Mediation Committee 
(Vermittlungsausschuss), which acts as a mediator. Sixteen delegates from each 
house of parliament compose the Committee, in proportion to each party’s share of 
seats in parliament. The Mediation Committee has historically been successful at 
formulating compromise proposals that all parties can agree to. Even by rival 
majorities, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat adopted more than 90% of the 
Committee’s proposals (ibid:84-85).  
The upper house also possesses a qualified veto (Einspruch) on legislation 
that does not need its approval. Einspruch implicates that after the reconciliation 
procedure in the Mediation Committee has been exhausted, the Bundesrat may still 
object to the bill, but the Bundestag can override the veto with a majority equivalent 
to the Bundesrat majority instigating the veto (Schmidt 2003a:58).  
The Mediation Committee gains particular importance when there are rival 
majorities in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (ibid:84), as was the case when the 
different bills comprising Agenda 2010 were to be voted on during the fall of 2003. 
After the state election in Sachsen-Anhalt in 2002, the opposition had a secure 
majority in the Bundesrat, meaning that states with pure CDU, CSU (in Bavaria) or 
CDU/FDP governments held more seats than the other government alternatives 
combined (Merkel 2003:170). Consequently, the opposition had the opportunity to 
block any bill that needed Bundesrat approval.  
The political situation in Germany, however, is such that the CDU/CSU and 
the FDP are positioned to the right of the government, traditionally demanding more 
far-reaching reforms of the welfare state and more supply-side oriented and liberal 
economic policies than the Social Democrats and the Greens. In other words, the 
opposition did have the opportunity to hamper or influence reforms, in accordance 
with the institutional argument discussed above, but the reasoning could be that the 
reforms did not go “far enough”. Hence, the diverging majorities could become a 
resource for the SPD’s “modernizing sector” in negotiations over reform: “Since the 
policy positions of the SPD’s “modernizers” are fairly close to those of the CDU, the 
“modernizers” could ally with the Bundesrat majority to push through more far-
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reaching reforms, even against the resistance of the “traditionalist” wing of their own 
party” (Zohlnhöfer 2004:127).36
The cooperation on such issues, however, is not guaranteed. According to 
Wolfgang Merkel (2003:174), two main motives guide the acts of political parties. On 
the one hand, they want to see their policies through (the policy-seeking motive), on 
the other hand, they want to gain votes in the next election (the office- or vote-
seeking motive). Several aspects of Agenda 2010 came close to traditional liberal 
policies, especially parts of the Hartz-laws. From a policy-seeking motive, we can 
therefore expect the opposition to support parts of the reform.  However, the vote-
seeking motive might cause the opposition to use their veto powers where they 
could, thereby demonstrating their power and exposing the government’s 
impotence. It is a difficult empirical task to determine which motive was the true 
motive behind the opposition’s acts, because the vote-seeking motive appears less 
legitimate than the policy-seeking motive. The point here is that the result is not 
given. Taking this into account, the next part will discuss to which degree the 
opposition played the veto-power card to hinder reform. 
4.2.4 Agenda 2010 and the diffusion of power effect 
The first reform of Agenda 2010 to be voted on was the health reform, which 
required Bundesrat approval. Thus, the reform was a result of long and hard 
negotiations between the opposition and the government, where several of the 
opposition’s proposals triumphed.37 According to Zohlnhöfer (2004:127), this reform 
is a case in point that the CDU/CSU teamed up with the modernizers within the SPD 
and pushed through far-reaching reforms. The final compromise on the health 
reform was passed in both houses with large majorities (Spiegel 09.26.2003).  
The rest of the reform package had more trouble passing both houses. 
Around half of the remaining bills that made up the reform package Agenda 2010 
required an affirmative vote in the Bundesrat. As table A1 in the appendix 
demonstrates, the opposition rejected every bill that was proposed prior to 
December 19. The official reasons for voting against these bills varied. The Hartz III 
and IV were rejected by the CDU/CSU because they wanted more dramatic cuts 
                                              
36 The “modernizers” include individuals within the SPD that supported supply side politics, as touched upon on page 8514. 
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and stricter sanctions for unemployed who refused to accept job offers (Geyer et al. 
2005:279), while the advancement of the tax reform was opposed because the 
opposition doubted that it would bring growth. Furthermore, they were opposed to 
the future Federal Labor Office taking over responsibility for the employable 
recipients of social assistance from the municipalities in fear of the “chaos it would 
bring” (Frankfurter Allgemeine 10.18.2003).  
Despite the fact that only some of the bills had to pass the Bundesrat, the 
reforms were combined to one “package” and sent to the Mediation Committee, 
where the parties met for negotiations in December 2003. The matters of dispute 
were, above all, the one-year advancement of the third phase of the tax reform to 
January 1, 2004, the reduction of the subsidies for commuters and homeowners, 
and parts of the Hartz IV (Geyer et.al 2005:281-285).  
During the giving and taking in the negotiation process, the opposition 
succeeded in passing some liberal policies while they were forced to give up others. 
For example, the CDU/CSU had to abandon their demand for law-regulated opening 
clauses, which would impinge on the sacred cow of the unions – the right to free 
collective bargaining.38 On the other hand, it was thanks to the opposition that the 
threshold value for the legal protection against dismissal was raised to ten instead of 
five employees. The Hartz IV was left mostly untouched in the Mediation Committee 
(Bannas and Leithäuser 2003; Siems 2003). However, the opposition fought for the 
principle that municipalities could choose whether the responsibility for employable 
(former) recipients of social assistance should remain at municipal level (Geyer et 
al. 2005:284). That the unemployed did not have to be paid at the going local wage 
(ortsübliche Löhnen) was also Union policy. Thereby, a de facto minimum wage was 
avoided, an important point for the liberals within the opposition (Bannas and 
Leithäuser 2003). In other words, several of the liberal elements of Agenda 2010 
were included thanks to the opposition. Only through these and other compromises 
could the opposition and the government agree on the whole reform package 
(Geyer et al. 2005:283-285). 
                                                                                                                                           
37 Examples include SPD’s favored structural reform of the health insurance system, which would loosen up the 
monopolized right of the doctor’s organizations to negotiate with doctors. The reform failed due to massive opposition 
from the CDU/CSU. For more details on the negotiations and compromises on the health reform, see Pilz (2004:197-203) 
38 Incorporating opening clauses into the law enables firms to deviate legally from collectively agreed rules under certain 
circumstances (Rosdücher 1994:462). 
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On December 19, 2003, the negotiation results of the Mediation Committee 
were voted on. As table A1 demonstrates, the opposition voted against some bills 
that did not need Bundesrat approval, including the Hartz III bill and some of the bills 
on pensions. This “veto” (Einspruch) was overruled by the Bundestag the same day. 
The rest of the bills composing Agenda 2010 were passed with the majority of both 
the government and the opposition. 
The question whether or not the opposition initially voted against the Agenda 
2010 reforms out of policy-seeking or vote-seeking intentions, I will leave open for 
debate. The fact remains that due to the incongruent majorities, compromises 
between opposition and government were required to make welfare state 
retrenchment possible. The opposition managed to hamper and then change the 
content of some of the reforms. It is therefore clear that there were diffusion of 
power effects, as operationalized above. This theoretically opens up for diffusion of 
accountability, according to new politics, which might shift some blame onto the 
opposition. The question whether the opposition was also held accountable for the 
reforms will be discussed in the next section, through studying press articles, 
demonstrations, polls and elections.  
4.2.5 Agenda 2010 and the diffusion of accountability effect 
The press. Press articles covering the negotiations in the Mediation Committee and 
the final vote on the Agenda 2010 focus both on the government coalition and the 
opposition, and the reforms are portrayed as a result of compromises (see i.e. 
Siems 2003 and Bannas and Leithäuser 2003).   
Apart from these early articles, the press “never” refers to the fact that the 
opposition was partly responsible for the reforms. When a possessive pronoun is 
linked to the reform (as opposed to referring only to Agenda 2010 or Hartz IV), it is 
always referred to as either the Red-Green government or the SPD, giving the 
reader the impression that Agenda 2010 was solely the Red-Green government’s 
responsibility.39 Though a reliable conclusion requires a systematic and scientific 
analysis of press coverage, I would argue that the blame-apportioning was generally 
                                              
39 „Die Arbeitsmarktreform der Bundesregierung“ (Agence France Presse 10.03. 2004; Associated Press Worldstream 
05.24.2003; Frankfurter Allgemeine 09.01.2004; Spiegel 08.23.2004; Stuttgarter Nachrichten 10.04.2004; Süddeutsche 
 11.13.2003),  „die rot-grüne Reformpolitik“ (Agence France Presse 11.02.2003), die Reformen der rot-grünen 
Bundesregierung (Stuttgarter Zeitung  08.23. 2004; taz 08.04.2004; Die Welt 05.24.2004) „Sozialreformen der 
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one-sided, giving the readers the impression that the Red-Green government alone 
was to blame for Hartz IV and other unpopular reforms. Was the media’s one-sided 
blame-apportioning reflected in demonstrations, polls and elections, or was the 
opposition also held accountable? 
Demonstrations. The reforms, particularly the Hartz IV, caused uproar among 
ordinary voters, particularly in the East. They expressed their discontent through 
demonstrations every Monday (Montagdemos), which reached their momentum in 
the spring and summer of 2004 (Frankfurter Allgemeine 09.01.2005). A couple of 
mass demonstrations were also arranged by the trade unions (Agence France 
Presse 05.24.2003; 04.04.2004). Judging by the discourse in a selection of 
newspaper articles, the general impression is that the critique and slogans were 
directed both at Agenda 2010 and the Hartz IV in particular, the cuts in social 
services (Sozialabbau) in general, as well as the Red-Green government directly.40  
Photos from the Montagsdemos support this impression. The slogans on 
posters were directed first and foremost against the Hartz IV, but also against 
Agenda 2010, the government and Schröder (photo_montagsdemo.de). 
Surveys on individual participators in the Montagsdemos indicate that the 
popularity of the PDS41 increased significantly from the federal elections in 2002 to 
September 2004, while the SPD and The Greens lost almost all their support among 
the demonstrators. The popularity of the CDU/CSU also fell, but from an already low 
level (Rucht and Yang 2004:24).42 The causal link from the demonstrators’ opinions 
on Agenda 2010 to the polling of each party is equivocal, but assuming that the 
demonstrators felt strongly about the cutbacks, it is safe to conclude that the 
popularity losses were mainly caused by the unpopular reforms.43 It also seems like 
                                                                                                                                           
Bundesregierung „ (Associated Press Worldstream 03.07.2004 and 10.02.2004; Stuttgarter Zeitung 11.06.2004) „der 
Reformpolitik der SPD“ (Schiltz (2005); Süddeutsche  05.23.2005; Die Welt 07.05.2004). 
40 Articles I have studied are: Agence France Presse 11.02.2003, 04.04.2004, 08.12.2004a; 08.12.2004b; Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 09.01.2004; Frankfurter Rundschau 10.20.2004; Spiegel 08.12.2004a; 08.16.2004; Stuttgarter Zeitung 
11.06.2004 and taz 12.03.2004. In the articles, I have studied the utterances from participants in the demonstrations referred 
to by newspapers, as well as what newspapers refer to as the focal point of the demonstration. 
41 The Party of Democratic Socialism, the PDS, was passionately opposed to Agenda 2010 (sozialisten.de1). The party is 
the legal successor to the Socialist Unity Party (SED), which ruled the German Democratic Republic until 1990. 
42 The participants were asked on which party they voted at the last federal election, and who they would vote for if there 
was an election the upcoming Sunday. SPD fell from 28% to 1.9%, and the CDU/CSU from 5.2% to 1.9% while the PDS 
rose from 22% to 33%. In the new federal states, the SDP fell from 21% to 0.7%, the Greens from 21% to 4.1%, and the 
CDU/CSU from 7.2% to 1.5%, while the PDS grew from 44% to 49%. It is interesting that the rightist NPD only saw a 
marginal increase (from 0.3 to 2.8 in the West and from 0.8 to 3.1 in the East).  There is no information concerning the 
FDP.  
43 Most of the demonstrators were affected by the Hartz IV. 43% were unemployed and 87% had relatives or acquaintances 
that were affected (Rucht and Yang 2004:22). 
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the demonstrators blamed both the government and the CDU/CSU, which is in 
accordance with the fact that 84% of the surveyed knew that the CDU/CSU had 
voted for the Hartz IV (ibid:23).44 Summing up, I would argue that the demonstrators 
blamed the government more than the opposition for the retrenchment.  
Polls. How were voters’ sentiments reflected in the polls? Figure 4.4 
illustrates the expressed (dis)satisfaction with the Red-Green government and figure 
4.5 describes the results of the answers to the question: “Which party would you 
vote for if there was an election held tomorrow?”. 
 
Figure 4.4: Satisfaction with the government 1998-2005. Percentages. 
Source: Infratest.de1  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Sunday question, development since 1997. Percentages. 
Source: Infratest.de2   
                                              
44 39% thought that the FDP-fraction voted against the Hartz IV, which is incorrect (Rucht and Yang 2004:33).  
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Figure 4.4 indicates that the Red-Green government experienced a sharp popularity 
drop immediately after the elections in 2002, when the satisfaction with the 
government fell from around 80% to around 60%. Thereafter, the satisfaction 
showed a varying, but increasing tendency until the start of 2005, when it again fell. 
These results are somewhat supported by figure 4.5. It is interesting to note that the 
development of the SPD’s and the CDU/CSU’s popularity is symmetric in both polls. 
The SPD’s loss is mirrored by the CDU/CSU’s gain. It therefore does not seem like 
the voters’ negative assessments of the government is reflected in the assessment 
of the opposition, which a diffusion of accountability effect would imply. To all 
appearances, the unpopularity of the reforms was not reflected in the assessment of 
the government until possibly in 2005. However, since these polls are not linked to 
the voters’ assessment of Agenda 2010, but reflect their general opinion of the 
parties, it is not possible to isolate the causal effect of the reforms.  
Elections. Table 4.1 shows the results at state and federal elections after 
Agenda 2010 was voted on in the parliament, while table 4.2 and 4.3 shows the 
results at the federal elections of 2002 and 2005, separated by state.  
 
 53
Table 4.1: Results at state and EP elections 2004 
1: Percentage votes/seats won. 2: pp change/Percentage change (my calculations).   
3: Percentage vote among unemployed voters/pp change (statistics on the unemployed does 
not cover all parties or states). Shaded columns = Eastern states. 
 Hamburg 
02.29 
2004 
Thüringen 
06.13 
2004 
 
EU-
parliame-
nt 
06.13 
2004 
Saarland  
09.05 
2004 
Branden-
burg 
09.19 
2004 
Sachsen 
09.19 
2004 
Schleswi
g-Holstein 
02.20 
2005 
Nordrhein
Westfalen 
05.22 
2005 
Federal 
election 
09.18 
2005 
CDU 1 
        2 
        3 
47.2/63  
+21.0/+80.2 
35/+25 
43.0/45 
-8.0/-15.7 
44.5/49 
-4.2/-8.6 
47.5/27 
+2.0/+4.4 
19.4/20 
-7.1/-26.8 
11/-12 
41.1/55  
-15.8/-27.8 
25/-26 
40.2/30 
+5.0/+14.2 
27/+10 
44.8/89  
+7.9/+21.4 
35/+9 
35.2/224 
+3.3/+10 
(a) 
FDP 1 
        2 
2.8/0 
-2.3/-45.1 
3.6/0  
+2.5/+227 
6.1/7 
+3.0/+97 
5.2/3 
+2.6/+100 
3.3/0 
+1.4/+73.7 
5.9/7 
+4.8/+436 
6.6/4 
-1.0/-13.2 
6.2/12 
-3.7/-37.4 
9.8/61 
+2.4/+32 
The  1 
Greens  
12.3/17  
+3.7/+43.0 
4.5/0  
+2.6/+137 
11.9/13 
+5.5/+86 
5.6/3 
+2.4/+85.7 
3.6/0 
+1.7/+90 
5.1/6 
+2.5/+96 
6.2/4 
0.0/0 
6.2/12 
-0.9/-12.7 
8.1/51 
-0.4/-0.5 
SPD 1 
        2 
        3 
30.5/41 
-6.0/-16.4 
32/-13 
14.5/15  
-4.0/-21.6 
 
21.5/23 
-9.2/-30.0 
21/-11 
30.8/18  
-13.6/-30.6 
26/-26 
31.9/33  
-7.4/-18.8 
19/-15 
9.8/13 
-0.9/-8.4 
7/-5 
38.7/29 
-4.4/-10.2 
37/-12 
37.1/74 
-5.7/-13.3 
39/-8 
34.3/222 
-4.3/-11 
PDS 1 
        2 
        3 
---- 
---- 
26.1/28  
+4.8/+22.5 
37/+9 
6.1/7 
+0.3/+5 
2.3/0 28.0/29 
+4.7/+20.2 
40/+12 
23.6/31 
+1.4/+6.3 
37/+11 
0.8/0 
--- 
--- 
0.9/0 
--- 
--- 
8.7/54 
+4.7/+118 
NPD 1 
        2 
        3 
---- 
--- 
---- ---- 4.0/0 
(+4.0)/0  
---- 9.2/12 
(+7.8)/12 
18/--- 
1.9/0 ---- ---- 
SSW 1 
         2 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 4.7/2 
(+0.9)/ 2 
---- ---- 
DVU 1 
        2 
        3 
---- 
--- 
--- 
---- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
---- 
--- 
--- 
6.1/6 
(+0.8)/6 
13/+5 
---- ---- ---- ---- 
WASG 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.2/0 --- 
Others 1 
           2 
7,2/0 
-16,4/-- 
8,3/0 
+2,1/-- 
9,8/0 
+4,6/-- 
4,6/0 
+2,6/-- 
7.7 /0 
+5,9/-- 
5,3/0 
+0,2/-- 
2.8/0 
-0,5/-- 
3,5/0 
+2,4/-- 
3.9/0 
0.9/-- 
 
(a): Including the CSU 
Sources: Forschungsgruppe_Wahlen.de, except from the distribution of seats, which is taken from 
Election.de1  
 
Table 4.2 Results at federal elections 2002 and 2005 in separate states, West Germany. 
Percentages. State names are abbreviated and listed in the list of abbreviations. 
Party SH HH NI HB NW HE RP BY BW SL Total,  
West Germany 
CDU/CSU 
2005 
36.4 28.9 33.6 22.8 34.4 33.7 36.9 49.2 39.2 30.2 37.4 
CDU/CSU 
2002  
36 28.1 34.5 24.6 35.1 37.1 40.2 58.6 42.8 35 40.8 
pp change -0.4 -0.8 0.9 1.8 0.7 3.4 3.3 9.4 3.6 4.8 3.4 
SPD 
2005  
38.2 38.7 43.2 42.9 40 35.6 34.6 25.5 30.1 33.3 35.1 
SPD 
2002  
42.9 42 47.8 48.6 43 39.7 38.2 26.1 33.5 46 38.3 
pp change -4.7 -3.3 -4.6 -5.7 -3 -4.1 -3.6 -0.6 -3.4 -12.7 -3.2 
Die Linke 
2005  
4.6 6.3 4.3 8.4 5.2 5.3 5.6 3.4 3.8 18.5 4.9 
PDS 
2002 
1.3 2.1 1 2.2 1.2 1.3 1 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.1 
pp change 3.3 4.2 3.3 6.2 4 4 4.6 2.7 2.9 17.1 3.8 
Source: Election.de 2 
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Table 4.3 Results at federal elections 2002 and 2005 in separate states, East Germany. 
Percentages. State names are abbreviated and listed in the list of abbreviations. 
Party BB ST BE SN TH MV Total,  
East Germany 
Total 
East and 
West 
CDU/CSU 
2005 
20.6 24.7 22 30 25.7 29.6 25.3 35.1 
CDU/CSU 
2002  
22.3 29 25.9 33.6 29.4 30.3 28.3 38.5 
Pp change 1.7 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.7 0.7 3.0  -3.4 
SPD 
2005  
35.8 32.7 34.3 24.5 29.8 31.7 30.4 34.2 
SPD 
2002  
46.4 43.2 36.6 33.3 39.9 41.7 39.7 38.5 
Pp change -10.6 -10.5 -2.3 -8.8 -10.1 -10 -9.3 -4.3 
Die Linke 
2005  
26.6 26.6 16.4 22.8 26.1 23.7 25.3 8.7 
PDS 
2002 
17.2 14.4 11.4 16.2 17 16.3 16.9 4.0 
Pp change 9.4 12.2 5 6.6 9.1 7.4 8.4 4.7 
Source: Election.de2 
 
Table 4.1 reveals that in the western states of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hamburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein, the SPD lost votes among the unemployed while the CDU 
gained accordingly. In the eastern states of Brandenburg and Sachsen, both parties 
lost while the PDS won many jobless votes. This indicates that only in the East, 
where the PDS was considered a real alternative, did unemployed voters turn away 
from both the CDU and the SPD.45 In states where there was no real alternative to 
the left of the SPD, the unemployed only turned away from the SPD, while the CDU 
generally increased.  
The renowned research group Forschungsgruppe Wahlen attributes the weak 
performance by the SPD in the elections for the European Parliament and the 
parliaments in Saarland and Nordrhein Westfalen amongst others to their unpopular 
federal policies (Forschungsgruppe_Wahlen.de). Also, the extreme right parties 
NPD in Sachsen and DVU in Brandenburg, as well as the socialist PDS in 
Brandenburg and Thüringen, profited from campaigning against the government’s 
reforms. In the elections in Hamburg and Schleswig Holstein, however, state politics 
were clearly more important than federal politics for the voters’ decisions (ibid).46 
The big loss by the CDU in Sachsen is also mainly attributed to other issues than 
the federal reforms (ibid).  
                                              
45 As we can tell from table 4.1, the PDS was a formal alternative also in most western elections, but obviously the former 
communist state party of the DDR was no real alternative for western voters.  
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The important elections in Nordrhein-Westfalen proved particularly disastrous 
for the government, where 39 years of consecutive social democratic rule was 
broken. The defeat caused Schröder to call re-elections (Spiegel 05.22.2005a; 
05.22.2005b). In his speech on the day of the vote of confidence, Schröder 
attributed the decision of asking for the vote to the SPD’s poor performance in the 
state elections and the Agenda 2010 is blamed for the bad election results 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine 07.02.2005). This demonstrates that Schröder interpreted 
the election result as an indication of the unpopularity of the reforms even if the link 
from the voters’ opinion on Agenda 2010 and individual voting behavior is unknown,  
Table 4.2 and 4.3, of the federal elections, shows that the SPD faced the 
strongest losses in 2005 in the East, while the CDU/CSU gained. As expected, the 
popularity of the Left Party also increased. Of special interest are the gains made by 
the Left Party in the West, where the polls of the PDS previously have been of no 
importance. 47 In 2005, the Left Party managed to win 30 seats in the East and 24 in 
the West, in contrast to only 3 seats won in 2002 (Election.de2). The data indicates 
that many voters turned to the alternative left of the SPD when they were given a 
“real” alternative. 
Taking lack of individual data and problems with internal validity into 
consideration, results from elections indicate that the SPD “took blame”, measured 
by lost votes, in all elections. The PDS profited from the loss, while the polls of the 
other parties, the CDU, the FDP and the Greens, paint a mixed picture. 
4.2.6 Conclusion - did diffusion of power outweigh diffusion of 
accountabilty? 
Regarding the diffusion of power effect, we concluded that power was definitely 
diffused, considering that the opposition used their majority in the Bundesrat to 
hamper and influence reforms. This diffusion of power opens up for diffusion of 
accountability, which I discussed through analyzing how the blame for reforms was 
apportioned in newspaper articles, elections, polls and demonstrations.  
The discussion showed that the blame for reforms was apportioned differently 
in the various arenas. Newspapers mainly refer to the government as responsible 
                                                                                                                                           
46 74%  (versus 14%) said that politics in Hamburg was more important than federal politics.  
47 More precisely, in the West, WASG candidates competed on the Left Party’s lists. For more information on the Left 
Party, see page 59. 
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for the reforms, and the general impression from the demonstrations is that the SPD 
was blamed more than the opposition. The polls show varying tendencies but mainly 
indicate that the CDU/CSU gained popularity when the SPD lost. In elections, SPD 
faced the biggest losses, also among the unemployed and in the East. Although the 
election results are not only caused by the unpopularity of the retrenchments, it is 
clear that Schröder attributes the SPD’s poor performance to the unpopularity of 
Agenda 2010. His decision to call new elections is a clear example of taking the 
blame, even if the link from the retrenchment to blame-apportioning is blurred.  
The causal effects are unclear and the findings disputable. More reliable 
conclusions require a more systematic investigation of newspapers, demonstrator’s 
slogans and individual voting behavior, which would be a separate master project. 
Still, the overall impression is one of a Red-Green government who has taken most 
of the blame for the unpopular reforms, while a free-riding opposition was able first 
to block, next to influence the reforms through their veto power in the Bundesrat, 
and subsequently profit from the popularity loss of the government. In other words, 
diffusion of power effects were stronger than diffusion of accountability effects. The 
old politics hypothesis 4.2.O receives support, while the new politics hypothesis 
4.2.N is weakened. 
Put differently, the fact that consensus was sought on reforms did not spare 
the government from being blamed. Would it look differently if consensus was not 
sought? On the one hand, it is probable that the SPD would have faced even 
greater losses if the opposition was not involved, in which case they might have 
been able to intensify the attacks on the reforms. On the other hand, it is quite 
unlikely that the opposition would have criticized the principle of retrenchment, 
considering that the CDU/CSU and the FDP are politically speaking positioned to 
the right of the Red-Green government.  
4.3 Left power resources and retrenchment 
4.3.1 Introduction 
According to the power resource perspective, strong left parties and unions have 
contributed to the growth of welfare state programs (Pierson 1996:150). Welfare 
states were “outcomes of, and arenas for, conflicts between class-related, 
socioeconomic interest groups” (Korpi and Palme 2003:425). An inversion of the 
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power resources perspective implies that weaker left powers and unions would open 
up for a retrenchment of the welfare state. According to Pierson, the power of the 
traditional guardians of the welfare state, trade unions and left parties, has actually 
decreased considerably. Since this is not reflected in radical cutbacks in social 
programs, he concludes that left parties and unions are not central as defenders of 
the welfare state anymore. Instead, what we can call “new interest groups” have 
taken over the leading role as welfare state guardians.  As an example of policy 
feedback from previous political choices, the welfare state has led to the formation 
of interest groups linked to particular social programs, such as groups for 
pensioners, health care consumers or disabled (Pierson 1994:30; 1996:150-151). A 
favored example for Pierson is the American Association of Retired People (AARP) 
(Pierson 1996:40).  
The above claims have been criticized by several scholars. By studying 
German and French welfare retrenchment, Elinor Scarborough (2000) claims that 
there are hardly any instances of organized groups of welfare clients emerging as 
main defenders. Instead, unions and left parties are still powerful obstacles to 
retrenching western welfare states. She is supported by Bonoli (2001:241), who 
claims that pro-welfare coalitions in continental Europe coincide with the labor 
movement, while issue-based pressure groups is a phenomenon of English-
speaking countries. Based on a comparative study, Korpi and Palme also find 
empirical support for the claim that left parties are central defenders of the welfare 
state, because “the risk for major cuts has been significantly lower with left party 
representation in cabinets” (Korpi and Palme 2003:441).  
Obviously, Scarborough and Pierson disagree on the strength of left powers. 
Pierson does open up for exceptions, as he claims that “the power of organized 
labor and left parties has shrunk considerably in many advanced industrial 
societies” (Pierson 1996:150, own emphasis in italics). It is unclear whether Pierson 
expects an emergence of new interest groups in the particular cases where unions 
or left parties are still strong. I will assume that Pierson considers the feedback 
effects from welfare state programs so powerful that interest groups have risen as 
prominent actors independent of the strength of other political actors, and that the 
“critical constraints on reform” (Pierson 1996:144) stems from these groups (and 
ultimately voters (ibid)) and not from left powers. I also assume that the “left power 
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resources” perspective implies that left powers will mobilize stronger against 
retrenchment than will new interest groups, also if left powers have lost strength. 
The implication of the inverted left power resources theory is that if retrenchment 
comes about, it is due to a loss of left power strength. This causal link is difficult to 
test since one must employ counterfactual arguments claiming that retrenchment 
would not have come about if left powers were stronger. I will therefore tone this 
discussion down and rather focus on mobilization. This enables me to test the new 
and the old politics hypotheses as rival explanations of the same case – the defense 
of the welfare state:  
 
The hypothesis on the importance of “new interest groups” as welfare state 
defenders is a part of the theory of new politics: 
4.3.N: New interest groups have emerged as the main defenders of the welfare 
state. 
 
The rival hypothesis on the role of left powers as welfare state defenders is old 
politics:  
4.3.O1: Left parties and unions remain the main defenders of the welfare state.  
 
The third hypothesis is also old politics, since the inverted left power resources 
implies that the strength of the left powers is an independent variable that can 
explain retrenchment. Simultaneously, I will test Pierson’s claim that left powers 
have lost considerable strength: 
4.3.O2: The power of labor unions and left parties has shrunk considerably. This 
has opened up for retrenchment. 
4.3.2 Theoretical concepts, operationalizations and validity 
The clarification of the actors referred to in the hypotheses is straight forward. Trade 
unions are organizations that defend the interests of employees opposite the 
employers (Østerud et al. 1999:54). In Germany, the eight most important labour 
unions are organized under the peak association DGB (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund), the two dominant unions being ver.di (Vereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft), the world’s largest trade union, and IG Metall.  
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Concerning left parties, it is common to position the SPD, the Green party and 
the PDS (and the WASG) to the left of the center on the political-ideological 
spectrum and the CDU/CSU and the FDP to the right (Schmidt 2003a:130). The 
PDS is the remnants of the former communist party of the German Democratic 
Republic, and the party is still almost exclusively an East German Party (ibid:146). 
The WASG (Die Partei Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative) was 
born simply as a protest against Agenda 2010, and was created amongst others by 
dissenters from the SPD and leftist trade unionists (taz 12.03.2004). In July 2005, it 
was decided that the WASG and the PDS would join forces before the federal 
elections of October 2005, and that the PDS would change its name to the Left 
Party (die Linke) (Speigel Online 07.17.2005).48 In June 2004, Oscar Lafontaine, 
Schröder’s political and personal foe, joined the party. He is presently a part of the 
leadership of the Left Party. 
“New interest groups” are groups linked to particular social policies such as 
interest groups for pensioners, patients or unemployed. The latter refers to interest 
groups different from trade unions.  Since the theoretical and operationalized 
concepts of “unions”, “left parties” and “new interest groups” are overlapping, the 
validity of these concepts is good.  
Pierson does not define the theoretical concepts “power” or “strength”, but 
merely claims that the power of left parties and organized labor has “shrunk”. In his 
brief assessments of particular cases of welfare state retrenchment, Pierson refers 
to party strength as domination of government and/or parliament (in the cases of 
division of powers) (Pierson 1996:161, 167, 170).49 With regard to union power, he 
mentions union density, the formal competences of the unions regulated by law and 
the centralization of collective bargaining (ibid:161, 170). The strength and role of 
new interest groups is not discussed (which indicates that such groups are not 
central actors in these countries, quite the contrary to Pierson’s central claim).    
Common theoretical definitions relate power to the actor’s ability to produce 
desired outcomes, and an actor’s power base to its possession of resources 
(Østerud et.al 1997:149). Evidently, Pierson focuses exclusively on passive power 
resources such as membership rates and formal competences when he assesses 
                                              
48 German electoral law did not allow the two parties to combine their lists, therefore, the WASG candidates ran on the 
PDS’s lists (Sozialisten.de2).  
49 The cases studied are Great Britain, Sweden, the USA and Germany. 
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the strength of left parties and unions. However, with regard to producing desired 
results – in this case obstructing reforms – it is sound to discuss both an actor’s 
passive power as well as active power. Active power refers to the actor’s ability to 
mobilize its resources or members through actions like participating in the public 
debate and arranging or participating in demonstrations or petitions.50 We can 
picture active power in relation to defending the welfare state as a continuum, 
stretching from “not being able to mobilize”, via varying degrees of mobilization, to 
actually succeeding in obstructing reform. The weakest form for obstruction is 
forcing responsible politicians to changing parts of the content of the reforms, while 
the most powerful actors are able to halt retrenchment entirely. 
 
No 
mobilization 
Mobilization, 
but no result 
Mobilization, 
leading to 
changes in 
retrenchment
Mobilization, succeding 
in halting retrenchment 
Obstruction
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 The continuum of “active power” 
 
Having presented the theory and discussed and developed valid operationalizations 
of the concepts of actors and power, I will next turn to the empirical case. The 
discussion of the hypotheses will be broken into separate treatments of the strength 
and role of left parties, unions and new interest groups. I will discuss the passive 
and active strength of each actor, how they mobilized to obstruct retrenchment and 
what success this mobilization had. If left powers stood out as main defenders of the 
welfare state, old politics is supported, and if new interest groups were leading 
protesters, new politics gains credibility. Possible pressure activity prior to the 
presentation of Agenda 2010 on March 13, 2003, will be kept out of the discussion. 
This is justified by fact that the period from the idea of Agenda 2010 was born until it 
was presented by Schröder was only one month, which gave affected groups little 
possibility to exercise pressure (Geyer et al 2005:250).  
Since several of the actors mentioned above met in the arena of the 
Montagsdemos (Monday demonstrations), I will give a presentation of these 
                                              
50 Lobbying will be excluded altogether, because getting an overview over lobbying is a difficult empirical task which the 
limit of this thesis does not allow. For a general discussion of the participation of German interest groups in decision-
making in the area of social policy, see von Winter  (1997:339-438). 
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demonstrations before I proceed with a discussion of the left powers and the new 
interest groups.  
4.3.3  Montagsdemos  
The Montagsdemos had great symbolic power, as they were first arranged in 1989, 
when opponents of the DDR regime took to the streets every Monday to fight for 
democratic reforms under the slogan “Wir sind das Volk” (We are the people). In 
2003 and 2004, Germans were using the same slogan to protest against Agenda 
2010, and their anger was primarily directed towards the Hartz IV.  
The Montagsdemos against Sozialabbau were first arranged in Leipzig in 
September 2003 and spread quickly (Frankfurter Allgemeine 09.01.2004). The 
movement reached its zenith in the spring and summer of 2004, but lost momentum 
in the fall of 2004. In late August, 130 000 demonstrators in around 145 cities, 
mainly in the East, took to the streets in the Montagsdemos (Agence France Presse 
08.24.2004).  
Different groupings organized and took part in the Montagsdemos in the 
different cities of Germany, and there was no overarching national organization 
(Yang 2005 [personal correspondence]).51 The overall impression is that the 
organizers were a crude mix of trade unionists, PDS members, members of link 
movements (i.e. Attac) and interest groups for unemployed, who were organizing 
and taking part either as members of their organizations or as private persons 
(Keller 2004 [personal correspondence]; Schmid 2005 [personal correspondence]; 
Wörthwein-Mack 2005 [personal correspondence]). A survey of the individual 
demonstrators show that the typical participant in the Monday demonstrations was 
male, between 50 and 55 years old and either unemployed or whose job security 
was not guaranteed (Rucht and Yang 2004:27). 
In addition to the Montagsdemos, other mass demonstrations were also 
organized. In May 2003, German trade unions arranged a mass protest against 
Agenda 2010, which attracted 90.000 participants (Associated Press Worldstream 
05.24.2003). More over, in April 2004, a European-wide protest against cuts in 
                                              
51 In Leipzig, the first action was organized by the Sozialforum and supported by amongst others Attac and local branches 
of the DGB, IG Metall and ver.di. Also, Netzwerk gegen Arbeitslosigkeit (Network against Unemployment) and ALV 
Landesverband (ALV = Arbeitslosenverband), which are interest organisations for unemployed, took part (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 09.01.2004). In Thüringen, in comparison, the initiatives were local and spontaneous, although amongst others 
PDS and DGB seem to have played a role as organizers “behind the scenes” (ibid). 
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social services was arranged by the European trade union organization. In 
Germany, half a million people in several German cities participated in the 
demonstrations against Sozialabbau and Agenda 2010, organized by German trade 
unions (Agence France Presse 04.04.2004).  
On August 11, 2004, just as the protests were reaching their momentum, the 
government announced changes to Hartz IV. The new unemployment benefit II was 
now made available to all recipients from January 1, 2005, and the children’s tax 
allowance of 4100 euro was to be paid from the child’s birth instead of from the child 
turns fifteen (Agence France Presse 08.12.2004a).52 The press accredited these 
changes to the pressure from the streets although the leadership of the SPD denied 
that there was a link between the Montagsdemos and the modifications (Agence 
France Presse 08.12.2004a; Spiegel 08.12.2004a; 08.12.2004b; Thewalt (2004)). 
Apart from these modifications, the pressure from the streets had no direct effect on 
the content of the reforms. 
The Montagsdemos were arenas where different leftist groupings and 
disappointed voters protested the politics of the Red-Green government. The left 
power resources model implies that the SPD should have fronted the resistance 
against Sozialabbau. Instead, as the instigators of Agenda 2010, they were the 
targets of the critique. The interesting role of the left parties will be discussed next.  
4.3.4 Left-of-centre parties 
Pierson claims that the power of left parties has declined, and that they therefore no 
longer are central as welfare state defenders. Scarbrough, on the other hand, 
argues that left parties are not generally in decline across Western Europe and that 
they will oppose welfare cuts, in line with the old politics hypothesis. What is true of 
German left parties? To answer this question, a separate discussion of the left 
parties in government and the left parties in opposition is necessary. First, I will 
assess the strength of the SPD and the Greens.  
The main left party, the SPD, has been the largest party in the Bundestag 
and has led the coalition government since it won the federal election in 1998 until it 
lost the elections of 2005. However, after the Red-Green government was elected 
                                              
52 According to the original rules, the first payments of the unemployment benefit II were to be paid out in February for 
those formerly receiving unemployment assistance, and the children’s allowance was 750 Euros until the child turned 15 
(Agenda France Presse 08.12.2004a). 
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for a second term in 2002, and especially after the introduction of Agenda 2010, the 
SPD has been losing support, proved by a loss of membership, poor results in polls 
(see figure 4.4 and 4.5) and elections at state, EU and federal level (see table 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3).53 After the defeat in the state election in Hessen in February 1999, the 
government lost its majority in Bundesrat, which it had held since 1991 (under Kohl), 
and through SPD’s loss in Sachsen-Anhalt in April 2002, the opposition gained a 
secure majority (Merkel 2003:170).  
Although the SPD has performed poorly since 2002, and the government’s 
powers were checked by the incongruent majority in the Bundesrat and the 
Bundestag (as discussed in part 4.2), it is premature to conclude that the power of 
the social democratic party has shrunk considerably. The Green party is also not 
facing serious decline. Quite the contrary, the Greens gained governmental 
influence for the first time in 1998, when it polled 6.7% of the votes. The party’s polls 
have been relatively strong since (see table 4.1) although it lost its ministerial offices 
after the election of 2005.   
Regarding the role of the SPD and the Greens as welfare state defenders, 
the fact that the SPD and the Greens carried out the welfare state retrenchment is 
arguably itself a proof that these left parties have lost their importance as guardians 
of the welfare state. However, this is the result of a change in politics (as discussed 
on pg. 14), not of a decline in power. “Traditionalist” factions within the SPD and the 
Greens opposed this change of politics through arranging an inner party referendum 
and voting against some reforms in their respective parliamentary parties and in 
parliament (Zohlnhöfer 2004:122). Apart from these factions, the politics of the SPD 
(and the Greens) does not fit into either the new politics or the old politics model, 
because they both imply that left parties will oppose reforms. Pierson and 
Scarbrough disagree on the strength of the left parties, which leads to different 
conclusions on their centrality as welfare state defenders. An explanation of the fact 
that the SPD (and the Greens) used their governmental and parliamentary powers 
to retrench the welfare state obviously needs other models. I will return to this in 
chapter five.  
The remaining left parties, the PDS and the WASG, positioned themselves as 
expected from a left power resources theory perspective. Both parties were strongly 
                                              
53 In 2004, the total SPD membership was reduced to 605.000. With a recorded loss of 45.000 members, SPD lost more 
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opposed to Agenda 2010 and in particular the Hartz IV. The WASG and the PDS 
demonstrated their opposition against the retrenchment through taking official 
stances strongly critical of Agenda 2010 (Sozialisten.de1)54 and through 
participating in and organizing Montagsdemos (Agence France Presse 11.02.2003; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine 09.01.2004). Since the demonstrations exerted little 
concrete influence on the policies of the government, the main obstruction of the 
Red-Green government’s policies was arguably the political alternative that the 
WASG and the PDS represented. In the elections of 2004 and 2005, the opposition 
towards Agenda 2010 probably explains most of the PDS’s good performance (see 
table 4.1 and 4.2). However, the consequence of the PDS stealing votes from the 
SPD is that the SPD will have to share the governmental power with the CDU/CSU. 
This will move German politics further to the right, increasing the probability of 
welfare state reforms gaining momentum. In other words – the political alternative 
represented by the PDS turned out to be an obstacle to the SPD, but not to the 
reforms. 
4.3.5 Trade unions 
Due to the German unions’ strong membership and the German system of “social 
partnership” through which unions have several channels of influence on social and 
labor policy, German unions have traditionally played an important role in social 
policy. This has tended to intimidate politicians from pursuing policies that “might 
provoke sustained protest from the unions or, alternatively, seek to buy off protests 
through compensation of the unions in other policy areas” (Schmidt 2003a:172).  
The next part will evaluate the passive and active strength of German unions 
and discuss whether they played a central role as obstacles to Agenda 2010.  
4.3.6 Trends in the development of unions’ power 
Union density. The membership density of western German trade unions was high 
and stable in the period from 1960 to 1990, and was boosted by the German 
unification, when the DGB gained four million new members (Jacobi et.al 1998:201). 
However, union membership declined from 11.8 million in 1991 to 7.7 million in 
                                                                                                                                           
members than any other party (Die Welt 02.02.2005). 
54 This a reference to the Left Party’s official “resource site” on Hartz IV, but a search on “Agenda 2010” through the 
official web site results in numerous critical press releases.  
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2002 (DGB.de). Total density was reduced from 28.1% in 1991 to 17.3% in 2000 
(Streeck and Hassel 2004:109-110). The loss of membership has contributed to a 
decline in bargaining power and to a trend towards “deunionisation”. In other words, 
the German unions’ passive power measured by membership density is sinking. 
However, in comparative perspective, the present German union density 
corresponds to the European average (Keller 2004:219).  
Collective bargaining. An important power base for German trade unions has 
been their monopolized right to represent employees in sectoral-level bargaining 
with employers (Flächentarifvertrag). In addition, they have the right to conduct 
wage-negotiations without state intervention (Tarifautonomie). Though the 
Tarifautonomie still is legally guaranteed by the German constitution, several 
tendencies in German industrial relations are infringing on the principle of sectoral 
bargaining, in effect reducing the passive powers of unions.  
Unions have witnessed an extended use of opening clauses (Kohaut and 
Schnabel 2003:215), a wave of so called Bündnisse für Arbeit or production site 
agreements (see pg. 37) and increased violations of tariff regulations (Bispinck and 
Schulten 1999). Last, but not least, there is the emergence of a growing segment of 
the economy, concentrated among small and medium-sized firms, which is marked 
by union-free, employer-association free, works council-free and collective 
agreement-free zones (Jacobi 2003:28). These are all developments that lead to a 
decentralization of collective bargaining from the sectoral to the plant level. At the 
plant level, the interests of the workers are at best represented by the works 
councils, who have no formal links to the unions and who do not have the right to 
arrange strikes.55 Dezentralisation thus involves a shift of competences from the 
unions to the work councils (Rosdücher 1997:460).  
Tripartism and Selbstverwaltung. Other channels of influence on social policy 
for the unions have traditionally been the principle of tripartism and the 
organizational principle of incorporating unions into the administration of social 
security systems (Selbstverwaltung).  
Tripartism was visibly established under Chancellor Brandt (1969-74). In the 
framework of concerted actions (Konzertierte Aktion), government ministers, unions 
                                              
55 In enterprises with more than five employees, they have the right to establish work councils. However, data indicate that 
only a minority (25%) of all eligible enterprises have elected work councils, and that these cover around 60% of the 
private-sector work force (Keller 2004:226).  
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and business representatives met regularly to negotiate on economic policy. In 
1996, the leader of IG Metall called for a renewal of the tripartism. Through an 
“Alliance for Jobs” (Bündnis für Arbeit), unions were to make wage concessions 
provided that the government promised to forgo welfare cuts and employers 
promised more employment. The Allliance for Jobs failed, but was reintroduced 
when Schröder instituted the Alliance for Jobs, Training and Competitiveness in 
1998 (Streeck and Hassel 2004:105-115). Scarbrough (2000:244) uses this alliance 
as a proof of trade union strength: “Currently, the Alliance for Jobs, bringing together 
industrialists, unions and the government to arrive at a new settlement, is the centre 
piece of the Schröder government’s agenda”. It is therefore ironic that also the 
Alliance for Jobs proved a fiasco (Streeck and Hassel 2004:117; Zohlnhöfer 
2004:111-112).  
Instead, Schröder switched to unilateral action, proven by the one sided 
appointment of the Hartz Commission, in which there were only two union 
representatives and one business association representative among 21 members. 
Further, a scandal in the Federal Employment Service (BA) caused Schröder to 
dismiss the leadership, appoint a confidant as its president, and through Bundestag 
legislation curtail the influence of the social partners on the BA (Streeck and Hassel 
2004:118-119).56 In addition, Schröder created a new “Superministerium” by 
merging the “red” Ministry of Labour (in which the unions had a stronghold) with the 
staunchly economically liberal Ministry of Economics, and replaced ex-union official 
Walter Riester with a right-winger, Wolfgang Clement as its director (Menz 
2005:204).  
Whereas state unilateralism largely replaced the principle of tripartism, the 
principle of self-administration, established already at the time of Bismarck, has 
hardly changed since, except from the changes in the system of self-administration 
in the BA described in footnote 56. 
Active Power. Union power is not only about densities and formal capabilities 
but also about their ability to deliver the membership. Since German industrial 
                                              
56 The hierarchy of the BA consists of three levels – one Zentrale, ten Regionaldirektionen and 178 Agenturen für Arbeit 
(Arbeitsagentur.de2).  The Selbstverwaltung of the BA implies that the unions, the employers and the state provide one 
third each of the representatives of the administrative board (Verwaltungsrat) (Arbeitsagentur.de3). Through the reforms of 
the BA, the administrative board was reduced to a supervisory board without operative responsibility, and the 
Verwaltungsrat was abolished entirely on the regional level (Regionaldirektionen). This is what Hassel and Streeck 
(2004:119) refers to as “curtailing the influence of social partners on the BA” (Streeck 2005 [personal correspondence]).  
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relations are comparably peaceful (Jacobi et al. 1998:222-228), German unions’ 
active powers, measured by their ability to arrange successful large-scale strikes, 
have only once been put to the test since the mid-nineties.  Historically, when 
strikes, or threats of strikes, have occurred, the demands of the unions have been 
met (ibid:222). Therefore, the huge failure of the largely unpopular strike IG Metall 
(Germany’s biggest blue-colour union) arranged in the new federal states in June 
2003 was an unprecedented defeat (Hartwich 2003: 289). Although the strike was 
not directed towards Agenda 2010, it caused a serious blow to the union’s prestige, 
displayed its weakening active powers and demonstrated that the IG Metall’s 
strength in the new federal states is limited (Fichter 2005:104; Hartwich 
2003:104).57  
It seems that German unions have lost some power in German politics. On 
the one hand, they have witnessed declining membership, the decentralization of 
collective bargaining, loss of prestige due to the failed strike, and increased 
unilateralism on the government’s behalf. On the other hand, the unions have kept 
their right to free collective bargaining (Tarifautonomie), their membership density is 
comparable to the European average and the principle of Selbstverwaltung has 
survived. The loss of strength is not considerable, but it does seem reasonable to 
expect that the relative decrease of passive and active power resources could make 
it harder for unions to produce desired outcomes. This assumption will be tested in 
the next part, as the discussion turns to the unions’ particular role in connection with 
Agenda 2010. What aspects of Agenda 2010 were the unions opposed to, in which 
arenas did the opposition materialize and what influence, if any, did unions have on 
the reforms?  
4.3.7 Trade Unions and Agenda 2010 
The unions were generally fiercely opposed to Agenda 2010, although the reforms 
reinforced a traditional internal division between “modernizers” and “traditionalists”. 
Whereas the leaders of the DGB, the IG Metall and ver.di were uncompromisingly 
critical of Agenda 2010, the head of the chemical workers union took on a softer line 
and urged the unions to find a compromise (Streeck and Trampusch 2005:15). 
                                              
57 The strike called for the introduction of the 35 hour week in the East. 
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The unions critical of the reforms concentrated their attacks on four aspects 
of Agenda 2010: First and foremost, they opposed Hartz IV, especially the reduced 
duration and level of unemployment benefits and the increased pressure on the 
unemployed to accept almost any available job. Second, the weakening of the 
protection against unfair dismissal was criticized. Third, the unions objected to the 
shortened subscription period on unemployment benefits for elderly, and finally, they 
were against the abandoning of the principle of equal financing of sick pay 
(Financial Times 05.07.2003; Pilz 2004: 206, 220). 
The reforms led to a deterioration of the relationship between the SPD and 
the labour unions. The unions felt that they were set aside and not taken seriously 
by the SPD leadership. This was confirmed by Schröder, who made it obvious that 
he did not consider the leader of the DGB a serious negotiation partner. In 
response, the unions boycotted the regular meetings between the SPD and the 
unions (die SPD-Gewerkschaftsrat) in May 2003 (Financial Times 05.07.2003)58, 
and thereafter presented a counterproposal to Agenda 2010 (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
05.09.2003). In addition, parts of the trade union movement supported the revolt 
within the SPD fraction in the Bundestag (the Mitgliederbegehren).59 Also, as 
mentioned, Unions arranged two mass demonstrations against Agenda 2010 which 
attracted 90.000 and 500.000 demonstrators.  
Unions and union members played a part in the Montagsdemos either as 
official organizers or as individuals, and the centrality of their role varied in different 
cities (Frankfurter Allgemeine 09.01.2004). In addition, the DGB arranged a petition 
against the reform policy of the government from June 2004. Instead of collecting 
millions of signatures as the DGB expected, only 750.000 union members, equaling 
11%, signed. Thus, the petition was considered a fiasco by parts of the press (i.e. 
Stuttgarter Zeitung 04.23.2005; taz 04.08.2005).  
I do not have any research on the degree to which the unions monopolized 
the role as reform-critics in the press, but recent research indicates that next after 
state actors, unions are the most powerful actors in the public debate on 
unemployment (Baum et al. 2005:10-11). My general impression is that this was 
also true of the public debate on Agenda 2010.  
                                              
58 The contact was picked up again in the end of June (Agence France Presse 06.19.2003). 
59 The leader of IG Bau Wiesehügel was one of the initiators and the leader of the IG Metall, Jürgen Peters encouraged 
members to support the petition (Geyer et al. 2005:267; Stuttgarter Zeitung 04.23.2003)). 
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Although the power basis of the German unions has eroded, they were active 
in the resistance against Agenda 2010, in line with the classic power resource 
perspective. However, despite heavy protests, the trade unions had little or no 
success in changing the content of the government’s policies. Only the minor 
concessions that the government made in August 2004 can, as discussed above, be 
credited to the pressure from the streets, in which labor unions played a part next to 
other actors.  
It is quite possible that the decrease in the unions’ passive powers made it 
easier for the government to carry on the retrenchment despite the opposition from 
unions.  The validity of counterfactual argumentation is however difficult to assess. 
More interesting is whether the importance of the role of the trade unions as welfare 
state defenders has decreased relative to that of new interest groups. This question 
will be discussed after I have assessed the role of the new interest groups in the 
next part. 
4.3.8 New interest groups 
In Germany, citizen’s interests were traditionally articulated by the “Big Four” – 
labour organizations, business organizations, churches and farmer’s interest groups 
(Schmidt 2003a:161). Today, Germany’s interest group system is more pluralistic. 
“New social movements”, such as Attac, and environmental organizations have 
gained importance (Roth 2001; Rucht and Roose 2001). Are there also examples of 
“new interest groups” and have they emerged as the main welfare state defenders? 
What we have identified as retrenchment was concentrated on the health sector, 
pensions and unemployment benefits. Therefore, groups connected to these sectors 
are of interest, in addition to what Pierson calls “public interest organizations”, which 
seek to defend the interests of those too weak to mobilize on their own. 
Public interest organizations. The two German Sozialverbände – the Vdk 
(Verband der Kriegs- und Wehrdienstopfer, Behinderten und Sozialrentner 
Deutschland) and the SoVD (Sozialverband Deutschland) - are examples of “public 
interest organizations”. In the post-war period, both organizations represented the 
interests of war victims, but as this client group decreased, they extended their area 
of interest to incorporate amongst others pensioners, handicapped people, patients, 
and people receiving social insurance (Sozialverband.de; Vdk.de; von Winter 
1997:192). The two organizations are working towards a fusion, and if they succeed, 
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they will represent two million members – more than all German political parties 
together. Both are experiencing strong growth in membership (7 pp annually), 
adding to their already considerable passive powers (Siems 2004).  
The Sozialverbände have mainly concentrated on defending their members’ 
social rights in court, as well as running class-action lawsuits in connection with 
social reforms. The SoVD, for example, challenged the legal status of the 2004 
pensions freeze in court (ibid). Concerning Agenda 2010, both the Vdk and the 
SoVD demonstrated that they also managed to mobilize their clientele. In addition to 
participating in organizing Montagsdemos (Frankfurter Allgemeine 09.01.2004), the 
Vdk organized its first demonstration in 20 years. It took place in Munich and 
attracted 30.000 pensioners protesting against “Sozialabbau und Rentenklau”. The 
SoVD arranged a demonstration in Berlin, which attracted 20.000 demonstrators 
(Siems 2004).  
Organizations for health care consumers. According to Karsten Grabow, 
there are some 100 patients’ interest groups in Germany, but these organizations 
are heterogeneous and organizationally weak. An association called Partitätische 
Wohlfahrtsverband “mobilized” most strongly against the health reform, as they 
were they only ones issuing critical press releases. However, they abstained from 
mass mobilization. In Grabow’s words: “The latest health care reform passed indeed 
without much organized resistance” (Grabow 2005 [personal correspondence]), an 
observation supported by dr Nils Bandelow (Bandelow 2005 [personal 
correspondence]. 
Organizations for pensioners. Regarding the representation of pensioners’ 
interests, labour unions and employers’ associations by far dominate “old age 
politics” (Alterssicherungspolitik) (von Winter 1999:167). With the average member 
being over 60 years old (Süddeutsche 12.31.2004), the concerns of the elderly are 
also the main occupation of the Sozialverbände discussed above. Other interest 
groups for pensioners and elderly have minor political importance, if you consider 
their negligible membership numbers and the low intensity of their activities (von 
Winter 1997:167). 240.000 people were organized in the eleven largest pensioners’ 
organizations in the eighties, and in comparison with Pierson’s favoured example of 
“new interest groups” – the American AARP – they are relatively insignificant 
(ibid:190-191). The passive powers of pure pensioner organization are in other 
words weak. von Winter (1997:191) argues that the lack of readiness to join 
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pensioners’ organizations stems from the fact that German pensioners are content 
with how their interests are catered to in the political arena. In addition, employees 
organized in trade unions have the option to prolong their membership when they 
retire, which leaves little need for pensioners’ organizations (ibid:191). Lastly, the 
decentralized organization of the German retirement insurances, which are divided 
by occupation groups inhibits a national organization along the lines of the American 
AARP, which represents beneficiaries of the tax based and national pension 
scheme (Bèland 2001:159) 
Two organisations stand out as exceptions; die Grauen Panther (the grey 
panthers) and the BRH (Bundes der Ruhestandsbeamten, Rentner und 
Hinterbliebenen) (von Winter 1997:167). The former is both an organization and a 
political party, and its membership amounted to around 10.000 in 1997, indicating 
little passive powers. To my knowledge, only die Grauen Panthers mobilized against 
reform.60 They concentrated on protesting the Hartz IV, on which they issued a 
critical press release (Die-Grauen.de). The panthers also urged everyone to 
participate in the Montagsdemos (Die-Grauen.de), and organized their own 
demonstration in Berlin against the cuts in social services, which attracted 1000 
demonstrators (Die Welt 03.30.2004).  
Organizations for unemployed. The unemployed are very difficult to organize 
on a permanent basis for several reasons.61 This is reflected in the weak passive 
power of the unemployed organizations. There were around 1500 such groups in 
1992, organizing only 0.5 – 3% of all registered unemployed (Baum et al. 2005:25). 
Unemployed organizations find it extremely difficult to voice their opinions within the 
public debate, which is monopolized by the state and the social partners (ibid:9-
10).62 Trade unions have better access to the political decision making, can 
organize strikes, are more successful in mobilizing and their financial situation is 
superior to that of the organizations for unemployed (ibid:8, 10). Because of their 
weak position opposite unions, unemployed organizations need to cooperate with 
                                              
60 A search in the newspaper database Lexis Nexis gives only a handful hits, and none on the BRH. The search was done by 
combining the following keywords: ((Die Grauen OR DBB) AND (Hartz IV AND Agenda 2010)). A search on the same 
actors in connection with keywords on pensions gave no results. 
61 For discussions on the difficulties with organizing unemployed, see von Winter (1999:232-234) and Baumgarten 
(2003:3-4). 
62 Baum et.al have done research on “political claims” made in the Süddeutsche  from 1995 to 2002. Political claims are 
“strategic interventions, either non-verbal, in the public space made by a given actor on behalf of a group or collectivity”. 
Unemployment initiatives had only 1% of such claims (Baum et al. 2005:9-10).   
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the unions in order to influence policies at the national level through the unions 
(Baumgarten 2003:2).  
As a result, the links between the organizations for unemployed and trade 
unions are close. 870 of the 1500 organizations for unemployed are actually 
affiliated with and run by trade unions (ibid:2). It is therefore difficult to isolate the 
activities done by the organizations for the unemployed as “new interest groups”-
activities in contrast to activities done by “classic” interest organizations like the 
unions.   
One of the largest organizations for unemployed is the independent 
Arbeitslosenverband Deutschland (ALV), which had 7000 members in 1999 (Die 
Welt 08.11.2004). To my knowledge, it was also the only organization 
demonstrating active opposition to Agenda 2010. The ALV participated in organizing 
several demonstrations, amongst others in Leipzig and Berlin (Agence France 
Presse 09.12.2004; Associated Press Worldstream 08.20.2004; Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 09.01.2004; Die Welt 08.11.2004). As mentioned earlier, the pressure 
from the streets resulted in minor alterations to the reform. However, the ALV must 
share the credit for this with all those participating in the demonstrations.   
4.3.9 Conclusion – were left powers or new interest groups the main welfare 
state defenders? 
The discussions of the passive and active powers of the left parties, unions and new 
interest groups, and their role as welfare state defenders, reveal several interesting 
findings. First, it is clear that the strength of German left powers has shrunk 
somewhat, but not considerably, as Pierson claims. If we compare German unions 
to new interest groups, German trade unions definitely have the strongest passive 
power with regard to membership numbers. In addition, the unions have several 
channels of societal influence, ranking from the Tarifautonomie to the right to strike.       
Second, the left power resources theory can explain the policy positions of 
the PDS, the WASG and the trade unions, but neither Pierson nor the inverted 
version of the left power theory are able to explain the fact that the SPD and the 
Greens actually used their powers in government to retrench the German welfare 
state.  
The retrenchment caused uproar among several groups, who to the streets to 
demonstrate against the Sozialabbau. Among these were both trade unions and 
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new interest groups who met in the arena of the Montagdemos. Which actors were 
the main obstacles against retrenchment – the trade unions or the new interest 
groups? 
First, it is clear that neither were successful in stopping the retrenchment. 
Whether the unions would have been more successful in halting the retrenchment if 
they were more powerful, in line with hypothesis 4.3O2, is difficult to say. Only minor 
parts of the reforms were changed after strong pressure from the streets. Neither 
trade unions nor new interest groups can take the credit for these changes, as many 
groups organized and participated in the Montagsdemos, along with large numbers 
of voters demonstrating as private people. One must therefore assess which actor 
was able to mobilize the strongest. 
Since it is difficult to say whether unions or new interest groups were the 
most active in mobilizing through the Montagsdemos, it is more relevant to look at 
the demonstrations arranged by unions or new interest groups only. Unions 
attracted much larger numbers of demonstrators compared to demonstrations 
arranged by other actors. In addition, unions were much more active in the press. 
This confirms that unions are still the main defenders of the welfare state. In other 
words, the old politics hypothesis 4.3.O1 is strengthened with regard to unions and 
the new politics hypothesis 4.3.N receives little support. 
Regarding the new politics theory, it is interesting to note that the German 
welfare state has had feedback effects. The organizations for pensioners, health 
consumers and unemployed are examples of beneficiaries of welfare schemes 
organizing to defend what they have in common – namely welfare benefits. 
Presently, these groups are weak relative to the trade unions, but the growing 
powers and membership numbers of the Sozialverbände is a case that fits perfectly 
into Pierson’s model. Anyone studying social political actors needs to pay careful 
attention to these organizations.  
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5. Summary and discussion 
5.1 Summing up the findings 
I will now recapitulate the main findings of chapter three and four in relation to the 
overarching research question “do old or “new” politics best explain the case of 
German welfare state retrenchment?”  
The two central aspects of new politics were the role of the “new interest 
groups” and “blame avoidance”. As mentioned earlier, it is unclear whether the 
contention is that blame avoidance is merely a description of how retrenchment is 
done or whether the use of blame avoidance strategies is an independent variable 
that can explain whether governments are able to avoid blame among the voters. 
The first variant is easy to reject in the German case. In chapter 3, it was 
established that the blame avoidance strategies of obfuscation, division and 
compensation were barely present in the German case. The second variant was 
discussed in part 4.2, where the conclusion was that the Red-Green government did 
not manage to avoid blame, even if the blame avoidance strategy of “consensus-
seeking” was used. In other words if we identify “the use of blame avoidance 
strategies” as an independent variable which can explain the degree to which 
politicians are able to avoid blame, the blame avoidance argument of the new 
politics might have explanatory powers. Even so, the newsworthiness and 
explanatory refinement of this independent variable appears rather meager. 
Part 4.1 employed an inverted version of the “new industrialism” argument on 
the German case. The discussion gave support to the old politics claim, that social 
dumping has created pressure to cut social wages. “Globalization” as an 
independent variable has in other words some explanatory powers in the case of 
Germany.  
In 4.2, the focus shifted from the economic deterministic variable to the role of 
institutions. It was established that the institutional checks caused by the 
incongruent majorities in the Bundesrat and the Bundestag produces a diffusion of 
power effect, which, according to the inverted version of the “new institutionalism” 
theory, would hamper retrenchment. The Red-Green government did have to 
cooperate with the opposition to secure the ratification of Agenda 2010, because the 
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CDU/CSU and the FDP voted against every bill comprising Agenda 2010. According 
to new politics, this diffusion of power would allow for diffusion of accountability in 
the sense that the government could share the blame for the unpopular reform with 
the opposition. The discussion of how the voters apportioned blame indicated that 
the government was blamed more than the opposition. Eventually, Agenda 2010’s 
prime mover, Gerhard Schröder even left German politics after the federal elections 
of 2005.  Again, the story of German retrenchment is better told by an old politics 
storyteller emphasizing the diffusion of power than one stressing diffusion of 
accountability.   
In part 4.3, the discussion centered on actors instead of institutions as the 
independent variable. According to the inverted version of “left power resources”, or 
old politics, left powers are still the principal guardians of the welfare state while new 
politics upholds that new interest groups have taken over the role as welfare state 
defenders. While there are examples of policy feedback effects in the sense that 
welfare state programs have “produced” interest groups fighting to defend their 
welfare benefits, these groups have definitely not surpassed trade unions, neither in 
terms of passive power, nor in terms of being capable of mobilizing against reform. 
As such, the second central claim of new politics, on the role of new interest groups, 
is not supported. Old politics only partly receives support, as it can explain the role 
of trade unions, but not the role of the main left parties, the SPD and the Greens.  
Summing up, it does seem like old politics, meaning the inverted versions of 
the theories of “new industrialism”, “new institutionalism” and “left power resources”, 
has a larger explanatory power than new politics, which incorporates “blame 
avoidance” and “new interest groups”. Pierson’s claim that old politics has limited 
explanatory powers is discredited. Obviously, the German retrenchment does not fit 
into the theoretical pattern of the new politics. One can easily reject a description of 
new interest groups as the foremost defenders of the welfare state. A description of 
the retrenchment strategies of the Red-Green government as an attempt to avoid 
blame is also false. Having found a divergent case, one could conclude that the 
credibility of the new politics theory is somewhat weakened.  
 76 
5.2 Discussion and identification of questions for further research 
Having reached a conclusion on the overarching research question, this part will 
elaborate on three interesting questions that arose from the case analysis: Why has 
the German welfare state not had feedback effects in the shape of strong new 
interest groups? Why did Schröder pursue retrenchment in the first place and why 
was blame avoidance not used? 
In part 4.3 it was established that the welfare state has had policy feedback 
effects in the form of new interest groups. However, these groups are weak and 
played merely a supporting role in the defense of the welfare state, while trade 
unions took the lead role. Why is this so? First, the decentralized organization of 
German welfare services could inhibit against the formation of strong and unified 
interest groups. Next, the presence of trade unions might crowd out the need for 
other guardians of the welfare state. Up until now, program beneficiaries could also 
count on the SPD (and the Greens) to voice their opinions. If the SPD keeps 
emphasizing the need for retrenchment, and if cutbacks are concentrated more on 
other areas than labor policies - which is the prime concern of trade unions - we 
might witness new interest groups gaining strength and influence.  
The next question is why Red-Green government retrenched the German 
welfare state without using blame avoidance strategies? The role of the left parties 
in government could keep a “left power” theoretician awake at night. The SPD and 
the Greens used their powers as governmental parties to retrench the welfare state, 
contradicting both the left power resources theory and new politics. As we have 
seen, the story of the Social Democrats leading the Sozialabbau had a sad ending 
in terms of the SPD’s results after the federal election of 2005. They had to share 
the ministerial offices with the CDU/CSU, and Schröder had to leave the steering 
wheel to CDU’s leader Angela Merkel. In the meantime, the SPD had alienated 
voters, fractions within their own party as well as trade unions. The political move to 
the right gave rise to parties left of the SPD, and disenchanted voters flocked to the 
new left party, the WASG and to the PDS, who both played the more comfortable 
role of defending the welfare state as the voters knew and liked it, perfectly in line 
with the left power resources theory.  
This scenario leaves observers with the question raised in the introduction: 
What was the thought behind the strategies of Chancellor Schröder and the 
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leadership in the SPD? Obviously, political leadership includes making unpopular 
choices, but why did they practice the political self-sacrifice it is to cut down on 
social benefits without hiding the cutbacks behind blame avoidance strategies? Was 
Schröder politically unwise? 
This must be seen in connection with why Schröder decided to retrench the 
welfare state in the first place. Obviously, cutting social welfare benefits are 
unpopular politics. German politicians would continue extending and improving 
benefits if they had the choice. I would argue that the very conviction of lacking 
political alternatives to retrenchment is the key to understanding why the SPD 
changed their political approach to the welfare state and decided to introduce 
Agenda 2010. As discussed in 4.1, the SPD has internalized the economic analysis 
where high social wages has a strangling effect on the German economy and 
contributes to high unemployment. High social wages add to other economic and 
structural problems like “the inflexible German labor market”, and a notion has been 
created of a German welfare state desperately needing an overhaul to improve the 
competitiveness of the German economy and thereby reduce unemployment.   
Despite the methodological difficulties with discussing the “social dumping” 
analysis and the correspondingly cautious conclusions made in part 4.1, I would 
argue that a deterministic analysis reducing politicians to tools in the hands of ”the 
economy” or “the globalization” has explanatory power in the case of Agenda 2010. 
The role of politicians is reduced, which is descriptive of the German case, where 
the SPD (and the Greens) moved to the right in the political spectrum. One could 
argue that it is a political choice whether one wants to adopt the form of analysis 
where leaving the welfare state “untouched” would lead to increasing unemployment 
and prolonged economic stagnation. However, without saying whether the economic 
analysis presents the truth, it is clear that the Red-Green government experienced a 
lack of alternatives, taking into consideration that avoiding cuts is a more 
comfortable option than piloting Sozialabbau.  
The next interesting observation is that politics does matter. Even though 
globalization might reduce the number of political options when it comes to 
economic and welfare policies, how the political parties position themselves in the 
political spectrum matters vis-à-vis voters. The political move to the right by the SPD 
opened up political room to its left. This room was occupied by the PDS in the new 
federal states, while in the West, the space was open for new initiatives 
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championing issues left behind by the SPD, like a keynesianist economic analysis 
and a staunchly pro-welfare approach. The WASG moved into this space, and soon 
entered into cooperation with the PDS, now known as the Left Party. Knowing that a 
majority of Germans is pro-welfare and five million are unemployed, it is no surprise 
that the PDS/Left Party reaped disappointed voters, while the SPD lost in the 
elections following the announcement of Agenda 2010. 
This indicates that it is not necessarily of significance whether there already 
are political alternatives to the left (the PDS was a tiny party on the federal level 
prior to Agenda 2010), because political alternatives will come to existence in the 
political space left by parties that move to the right (given that it’s possible to clear 
legal hurdles for creating a political party). The implication of this analysis is that 
parties that move to the right will lose voters to the left. The condition for this 
analysis to be correct is that voters are “unfaithful” in the sense that they have little 
party identification. For example, the voters’ political standpoints, like opposing cuts 
in benefits, is more important to former SPD-voters than being faithful to the party. 
When facing such voters, office-holders must react to the opinion of the voters and 
pursue popular policy agendas (Alber 1996:4-5) or obscure unpopular agendas. If 
not, they risk losing their votes.  
This one-dimensional picture of political processes is implied in Pierson’s 
blame avoidance model. Left out is the notion that governments are able to 
influence the perceptions of voter groups (ibid). I would argue the blame avoidance 
model would improve if it better accounted for alternative blame avoidance 
strategies focusing on how the retrenchment is presented and framed, and not just 
on how the cutbacks are designed. If politicians use justification strategies and 
emphasize the financial need for cutbacks, they might get away with the 
retrenchment. They need to persuade voters that the changes are necessary to 
save the welfare state, in contrast to welfare state retrenchment as a matter of being 
against the welfare state per se (Green-Pedersen 2002:33-35). Following a “Nixon 
goes to China” logic, left wing parties should have better chances at getting away 
with retrenchment because they “own” the welfare state issue in the sense that the 
voters expect them to defend the welfare state. They could therefore appear more 
reliable when they present the retrenchment as necessary to save the welfare state 
in the long run or to correct policy failures (Ross 2000). 
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The argument is based on an assumption that parties do not only articulate 
and accommodate voters’ preferences but are also able to shape public opinion. 
The intensity of the message delivered will influence the possibilities of shaping 
preferences (Padgett 2005:248). Pierson does bring up this aspect in his final 
conclusions, when he mentions how the EU provides opportunities to shift the blame 
towards this institution if the national government can present reforms as legally 
required or economically necessary (ibid:178). He also remarks that moments of 
budgetary crisis might open up for framing the reforms “as an effort to save the 
welfare state rather than destroy it” (Pierson 1996:177). I would argue that not only 
budget crisis, but also other types of economic “crises”, like strangling 
unemployment, open up for justifying reforms. There is a sizeable literature on the 
link between economic conditions and voting behavior, where unemployment and 
inflation are factors that have proven especially relevant explanatory variables 
(Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000:113-114). Research also indicates that supporters of 
left parties are particularly averse to unemployment (Carlsen 2000:142). Indeed, if 
voters’ perception on the government’s effort to reduce unemployment can explain 
voting behavior, high unemployment can also be turned into a source of strength. In 
times of high unemployment, voters might stomach reforms if they believe it will 
increase employment. 
In this context, it is imperative that that the reforms resulted in decreasing 
unemployment within the government’s term of office.  As maintained by Pierson; 
(1994:8) retrenchment involves exposing concentrated voter groups to concrete and 
immediate losses in return for diffuse and uncertain gains. If the gains, reduced 
unemployment, were to materialize, the voters could have forgiven the Red-Green 
government the unpopular reforms and renewed their mandate in the next election. 
When unemployment on the contrary kept increasing, it was very unlikely that the 
government would survive the next election. This could also explain why Schröder 
did not obfuscate results through decrementalism or delays. Delaying cuts could 
also delay results. The voters had signaled a lack of belief in his capability of 
pursuing reform. By presenting Agenda 2010 with much fanfare, Schröder appeared 
handlungsfähig and reformwillig63, and he could even become historic as the man 
who stopped the trend of increasing unemployment. Perhaps he also hoped for a 
                                              
63 ”Capable of acting” and ”willing to countenance reform”.  
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stronger “Nixon goes to China”-effect than what he encountered. Instead, Schröder 
faced an angry backlash from voters who were disappointed with the welfare state 
guardians. 
A more explicit incorporation of such aspects into the model of blame 
avoidance would enhance the model’s explanatory powers, though simultaneously 
complicating it. A focus on the framing of reforms, or in other words the way which 
political leaders try to sell the reform to the voters, could explain cases where there 
is an obvious lack of other blame avoidance strategies. It could explain why a 
political leader of the left, who traditionally has been a staunch defender of the 
welfare state, chooses not to hide the retrenchment through obfuscation techniques. 
The social democrat wants to appear capable of action, at the same time as he or 
she endeavors to frame the retrenchment as an attempt to save the treasured 
welfare state or to give the voters jobs.  
With the benefit of hindsight, an assumption based on the justification model 
implies that Schröder probably did not sell the reforms in a convincing way, since he 
did not manage to avoid blame. A discourse analysis of the way in which the 
reforms were presented would be of interest to test this assumption.  
In addition, as an explanation for why he did not obfuscate retrenchment, 
Schröder might have calculated with the fact that he did not risk attacks from the 
right, because the CDU/CSU and FDP traditionally have been agents for 
retrenchment. He might also have hoped that the opposition would take a greater 
part of the blame considering that their cooperation was necessary and probable. 
Finally, Schröder could have been politically unwise, and miscalculated the wrath of 
the voters and the degree to which parties to his left could profit on his political 
move to the right.  
We can only speculate in the reasons for not pursuing blame avoidance 
strategies. For reliable conclusions, the political process leading up to Agenda 2010 
should be thoroughly studied, also including qualitative interviews with central policy 
makers to gain information.  
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Appendix  
Table A1 The progress of Agenda 2010. BR=Bundesrat, BT=Bundestag, MR= Mediation Committee. 
Shaded areas = Bill before Bundestag. 
 
Date, 
all in 
2003 
Sou
-rce 
Bill 
(my translation) 
Bill before 
which 
house? 
Vote, 
CDU/CSU and 
FDP 
Vote, 
SPD/Green
s 
Required  
approval by BR? 
Source:12 
Status 
06.27 1) 1. No translation BT Against For No To the BR 
07.12 2) 1. BR Against  For  No To the MC 
09.26 3) 2. Health reform  BT For For Yes To the BR 
 4) 3. Relaxed 
protection against 
unfair dismissal  
BT Against For No To the BR 
  4) 4. Reduced duration 
of unemployment 
benefit  
BT Against For No To the BR 
17.10 5) 2. BR For For Yes Passed 
 5) 3. BR Against For No To the MC 
 5)  5. Advancement of 
the tax reform. 
Accompanying 
budget law 2004: 
cuts in subsidies for 
commuters and 
homeowners  
BT Against For Yes To the BR 
 5) 6. Hartz III  BT Against For No To the BR 
 5) 7. Hartz IV  BT Against For  Yes 
 
To the BR 
  8. Reform of social 
assistance 
BT Against For Yes To the BR 
 5) 9. Tightening of 
work ability 
requirements 
BT Against For Yes To the BR 
 5) 10. Reform of 
communal finances 
BT Against For Yes To the BR 
 5) 11. Law on 
promoting tax 
honesty  
BT Against For  Yes To the BR 
 5)  12. Tax on tobacco  BT Against For No To the BR 
11.07 6) 13. Pensions freeze BT Against For No To the BR 
 6) 14. Postphonement, 
disbursement of 
pensions 
BT Against For Yes To the BR 
 6) 15. Full contributions 
by pensioners to 
long-term care 
insurance 
BT Against For No To the BR 
 6) 16. Reduction of the 
fluctuation reserve 
BT Against For No To the BR 
11.07 7) 4-12 BR Against For  No:5,9 
Yes:4,6,7,8 
To the MC 
27.11 8) 15. Law on master 
craftsmen 
BT Against For Yes To the  BR 
28.11 9) 15. BR Against For Yes To the MC 
28.11 10) 13-16 BR Against  For Both To the MC 
19.12 11) 1, 3, 4, 5, 7-12, 14 BR  CDU/CSU:for 
FDP:against 
For Yes To the MC 
 11) 6, 13,15,16 BR For Against No To the BT 
 11) 1,3,4,5,7-12,14 BT For  For Yes Passed 
 11) 6,13,15,16 BT Against For No Passed   
Sources:  
1) taz 06.28.2003 
2) taz 07.12.2003 
3) Spiegel 09.26.2003 
4) Agence France Presse 09.26.2003 
5) Frankfurter Allgemeine 10.18.2003 
6) Stuttgarter Zeitung 11.07.2003 
7) Süddeutsche 11.08. 2003 
8) Frankfurter Rundschau 11.28.2003 
9) Agence France Presse 11.28.2003 
10) Associated Press Worldstream 11.28.2003  
11) Spiegel 12.19.2003 
12) Pilz (2004:211-212) 
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